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Abstract
How does the presence of financial frictions alter the Phillips curve and the conduct
of optimal monetary policy? I investigate this question in a tractable small-scale
New Keynesian DSGE model with a financial accelerator. The accelerator decreases
the slope of the Phillips curve, amplifies shocks and renders forward-looking behav-
ior more relevant for current macroeconomic dynamics. I prove analytically that
these three factors imply an inflationary bias of discretionary monetary policy rel-
ative to the standard model and a stabilization bias relative to commitment policy.
A conservative central banker who places a larger weight on inflation stabilization
than society is able to reduce both biases and closely mimics the optimal policy
under commitment. The required degree of inflation conservatism increases in the
degree to which financial frictions are present.
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1 Introduction
The missing disinflation in the face of the collapse of output in many advanced economies
after the Global Financial Crisis raised a delicate question for macroeconomists: Is the
Phillips curve alive and well after all (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015; Hall, 2011;
King and Watson, 2012)? This question challenges the idea that inflation and the level of
economic activity are inherently linked, a notion that constitutes a fundamental corner
stone of modern thinking about monetary policy. Despite the pressing importance of
resolving the missing disinflation puzzle, economists failed to reach a consensus to date.
In this paper, I propose a novel explanation for the missing disinflation puzzle: The in-
terplay between financial frictions, the Phillips curve and the optimal response by central
banks. I show that financial frictions – a standard ingredient of many structural macroe-
conomic models today1 – alter the Phillips curve and thereby inflation dynamics in three
distinct ways. First, they generate a counter-cyclical credit spread that dampens the
pro-cyclicality of marginal costs, which in turn decreases the slope of the Phillips curve
with respect to the output gap.2 Second, they amplify the effects of structural shocks
by creating endogenous cost-push effects.3 Third, financial frictions are associated with
uncertain future returns and thus render forward looking-behavior by households and
firms more relevant for inflation dynamics.4
Having established how financial frictions alter the Phillips curve, I analyze how mon-
etary policy should optimally be conducted in this different macroeconomic environment.
Broadly speaking, I find that optimal monetary policy is geared towards inflation stabi-
lization in the presence of financial frictions. This is mainly due to the flatter Phillips
curve, which worsens the central bank’s trade-off between output gap and inflation sta-
bilization and renders the former more costly. The combination of financial frictions and
central banks’ optimal response thus constitutes a potential explanation for the missing
disinflation puzzle in recent years.
I obtain these findings within an analytically tractable small-scale New Keynesian
DSGE model with a labor variant of the financial accelerator by Bernanke et al. (1999). In
the model, wages have to be paid before production. Firms are operated by entrepreneurs,
who finance the wage bill either by equity or debt financing. The loan contract is subject
to a costly state verification problem, which gives rise to a non-zero credit spread that
1These models were mainly proposed after the Global Financial Crisis to characterize the interaction
between the financial sector and the macroeconomy. Most of them are based on the notion of Bernanke
and Blinder (1988) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1995) that financial frictions result from agency
costs such that balance sheets of households, firms and/or banks are crucial for macroeconomic dynamics.
2This is in line with results obtained by Christiano et al. (2014) and Del Negro et al. (2015), who
estimate a very flat Phillips curve using medium-scale financial accelerator models.
3See Wieland et al. (2016) and Binder et al. (2017), who document that most financial frictions imply
a strong acceleration of macroeconomic shocks on impact relative to models without such frictions.
4In the financial accelerator framework by Bernanke et al. (1999) and the workhorse banking model
by Gertler and Karadi (2011), expectations of future returns on investing in capital play a key role.
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depends on the entrepreneur’s leverage. Leverage is counter-cyclical, which translates
into a counter-cyclical credit spread that affects marginal costs.
To investigate optimal monetary policy in the context of financial frictions, I proceed
in several steps. I first ask: What is the welfare-optimal mandate under financial frictions,
i.e. should monetary policy focus on traditional inflation and output gap stabilization
and/or stabilize financial variables? I derive the second-order approximation of household
utility and show that it gives rise to a mandate for stabilizing inefficient fluctuations in
the credit spread and entrepreneur leverage. This mandate is equivalent to closing the
output wedge between the flexible-price financial accelerator economy and the efficient
economy in the absence of price and financial frictions. With an appropriate redefinition
of the output gap, the traditional central bank mandate of inflation and output gap
stabilization relative to the efficient allocation thus prevails under financial frictions.
In a second step, I analyze how the presence of financial frictions affects the trans-
mission mechanisms of monetary policy and aggregate shocks. A given change in the
nominal interest rate induces counter-cyclical fluctuations in entrepreneur leverage and
marginal costs. As a result of this flattening of the Phillips curve, the inflation-output
gap trade-off worsens such that output gap stabilization is more costly in terms of in-
flation. I furthermore demonstrate that financial frictions induce a breakdown of divine
coincidence, as shocks are amplified via inefficient credit spread and leverage fluctuations
that create endogenous cost-push effects.
I then proceed to investigate the ability of monetary policy to stabilize the economy
in the face of financial frictions. The tractability of the model allows me to solve the
model under optimal discretionary monetary policy in closed form. Under discretion,
the targeting rule prescribes a stronger contraction of the output gap as a response to
inflation in the presence of financial frictions. This implies a substantial inflationary bias
under discretion relative to the standard model, with the bias increasing in the degree of
financial frictions. Both biases are amplified by the breakdown of divine coincidence and
the higher degree of forward-looking behavior being inherently ignored under discretion.
Having established the sub-optimality of discretion under the welfare-based mandate,
I then ask if policy performance can be improved even if the central bank is not able to
credibly commit to a future policy. I prove that the stabilization bias relative to first-best
policy in the face of financial frictions can be mitigated if society appoints an inflation-
conservative central banker in the spirit of Rogoff (1985). If the central banker puts a
higher weight on inflation stabilization, the public knows that inflation will respond less
to any shock, such that expected inflation also reacts less to cost-push shocks. I derive
the welfare-maximizing inflation weight analytically and prove that it increases in the
degree of financial frictions and shock persistence. I show numerically that discretionary
policy with inflation conservatism closely mimics optimal policy under commitment in
the financial accelerator economy.
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This paper is related to the large literature investigating the missing disinflation puz-
zle (Hall, 2011; King and Watson, 2012). Ball and Mazumder (2011, 2018) and Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2015) explain the missing disinflation by anchored household/firm
expectations. Gordon (2013), Watson (2014) and Krueger et al. (2014) propose various
different measures of economic slack to reconcile the Phillips curve with the missing dis-
inflation. In line with the paper at hand, Christiano et al. (2015), Del Negro et al. (2015)
and Gilchrist et al. (2017) argue that financial frictions are a potential explanation of
the missing disinflation puzzle and help to explain inflation dynamics in recent times.
These papers use medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE models that are estimated using
Bayesian techniques and/or solved numerically. In contrast, I focus on the effects of
financial frictions on the Phillips curve in a small-scale model that can be solved analyti-
cally. This allows me to investigate the relationship between structural financial frictions
parameters and the Phillips curve, in particular with respect to its slope. I am also able
to characterize a closed-form solution that allows me to analyze the interplay between
the Phillips curve under financial frictions and the optimal response of monetary policy.
In doing so, the explanation for the missing disinflation put forward in this paper
complements the literature mentioned above. One main finding of this paper is that
monetary policy should be geared towards inflation stabilization in the presence of finan-
cial frictions. If central banks follow this optimal policy (at least partly), an anchoring
of private inflation expectations should be expected. Furthermore, a key implication of
the paper at hand is that the definition of output gap as a measure of economic slack
is crucial to understand the Phillips curve in the face of financial frictions. The results
of this paper should hence be seen as complementary rather than contradictory to other
explanations for the disinflation puzzle.
In a broader context, this paper is part of the literature investigating optimal monetary
in the presence of financial frictions.5 Carlstrom et al. (2010) introduce agency costs in
the spirit of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in a small-scale model. De Fiore and Tristani
(2013) investigate the financial accelerator in an extension of the basic New Keynesian
model. Cu´rdia and Woodford (2016) extend the model by a reduced-form link between
credit spreads and macroeconomic conditions motivated by household heterogeneity and
the need for financial intermediation. Several other papers analyze the performance of
simple interest rate rules in models with financial frictions, see for example Bernanke and
Gertler (2001), Gilchrist and Leahy (2002), Faia and Monacelli (2007) and Boehl (2017).
A recurring finding from these papers – although sometimes implicit – is that financial
frictions create endogenous additional mark-up effects and/or alter marginal costs. As
shown explicitly in the paper at hand, this leads to a breakdown of the canonical ”divine
5Seminal contributions with respect to optimal monetary policy within the standard New Keynesian
DSGE framework encompass Clarida et al. (1999), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) Woodford (2002),
Walsh (2003), Blanchard and Gal`ı (2007) and many others.
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coincidence” property of standard models, i.e. financial frictions generate or reinforce the
policy trade-offs between stabilizing inflation and the output gap.
The closest papers to the analysis at hand are the ones by De Fiore and Tristani (2013)
and Boehl (2017), who also consider optimal monetary policy in a small-scale financial ac-
celerator model. However, they focus on optimal commitment policy and optimal simple
rules, respectively. In contrast, I analyze optimal monetary policy under discretion, when
the central bank lacks the ability to commit to future actions. I also provide a tractable
variant of the financial accelerator framework that allows for closed-form solutions under
discretion. This allows me to go beyond the numerical analysis presented in previous pa-
pers. I characterize analytically the various transmission channels of interest rate policy
and disentangle the factors leading to the inflation bias of discretionary monetary policy
under the financial accelerator relative to the standard New Keynesian model. On the
basis of this characterization, I am then able to investigate the welfare-optimal mandate
for discretionary monetary policy in the presence of financial frictions and establish the
optimality of inflation conservatism.
The notion of inflation conservatism follows the seminal contribution by Rogoff (1985).
For the standard New Keynesian model, Clarida et al. (1999) establish that a central
banker with a lower weight on output gap stabilization relative to inflation mitigates
the stabilization bias of discretionary policy. Adam and Billi (2008), Adam and Billi
(2014), and Niemann (2011) analyze inflation conservatism with endogenous fiscal policy.
Schmidt and Nakata (2015) show that inflation conservatism is advisable if the zero
lower bound on nominal interest rates is explicitly taken into account. In contrast to
these papers, I investigate the implications of financial frictions for the optimality of the
central bank conservatism. Paoli and Paustian (2017) argue numerically that appointing
a conservative central banker may improve outcomes when macroeconomic stabilization
is a joint mandate of monetary and macroprudential policy in a banking-type model a` la
Gertler and Karadi (2011). In contrast to their analysis, I employ the canonical financial
accelerator mechanism, focus solely on monetary policy and provide fully analytic results,
including conditions under which the degree of inflation conservatism is increasing in the
degree of financial frictions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model setup, derives a
tractable three-equation representation and outlines that the model incorporates the three
key characteristics of many financial frictions models. Section 3 derives the household
welfare approximation to provide a first benchmark central bank mandate. Section 4
investigates optimal discretionary monetary policy. I first provide an analytic solution
of the model and characterize the inflationary bias in the financial accelerator economy
relative to the standard model. I then establish the advisability of inflation conservatism
and shows that inflation-conservative discretionary policy is able to substantially reduce
the stabilization bias relative to the fully optimal commitment policy. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The Model
I propose a small-scale New Keynesian DSGE model with an accelerated cost channel of
monetary policy, giving rise to a financial accelerator mechanism. This section describes
the model setup, depicts its characteristics and analyzes the featured economic channels.
2.1 The Economy
The model environment is populated by a representative households and a continuum of
risk-neutral entrepreneurs, with the latter operating wholesale goods firms. In contrast
to the standard model, wages have to be paid before production as in Ravenna and
Walsh (2006) such that entrepreneurs need to obtain external financing. The presence of
a costly-state-verification problem between financial intermediaries and wholesale firms
requires the loan rate to be a mark-up over the safe interest rate, with the mark-up
being a function of firm leverage. This generates a financial accelerator mechanism a` la
Bernanke et al. (1999).
The timing of events is as follows: At the beginning of the period, the aggregate tech-
nology shock materializes.6 Financial markets open, and households decide on consump-
tion and savings. The financial intermediary collects household deposits, and financial
traders purchase equity claims from the entrepreneurs. Afterwards, the entrepreneurs
obtain external financing via a standard debt contract from financial intermediaries con-
tingent on the amount of available funds raised on the stock market. In the second
part of the period, the goods market opens and an idiosyncratic wholesale productiv-
ity shock materializes. Wholesale firms produce the homogeneous good subject to their
idiosyncratic productivity and sell it to retailers. If the realization of their individual
productivity shock is too low, they default and the financial intermediary seizes the re-
maining production. Otherwise, they repay their debt to the financial intermediary and
rebate their profits to stockholders, which in turn rebate them lump-sum to households.
Finally, retail firms use the wholesale goods to produce differentiated goods and sell them
to households for consumption.
Households: The household sector is completely standard. A representative infinitely
lived household maximizes expected present discounted value of utility given by
Ut = Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
{
C1−σt+s
1− σ − χ
H1+ηt+s
1 + η
}
specifying that utility is separable in consumption Ct and labor supply Ht. Consumption
6In the baseline setup, this is the only aggregate shock. In Section 4.3, I present an extension of the
model with aggregate preference and financial shocks, which is shown in more detail in the Appendix.
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Ct is a composite of differentiated goods cjt such that
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
C
−1

jt dj
] 
−1
where  governs the elasticity of substitution. The representative household holds deposits
Bt at a financial intermediary, which yield a safe gross nominal return Rt in the next
period. The household also receives real wages Wt from supplying labor Ht and lump-
sum aggregate profits Ωt from financial intermediaries and retail firms. The household’s
budget constraint in nominal terms is thus given by
PtCt +Bt ≤ Rt−1Bt−1 + PtWtHt + Ωt
Household optimization gives rise to the following standard Euler equation governing the
inter-temporal allocation of consumption
C−σt = βEt
[
Rt
Πt+1
C−σt+1
]
(1)
where Πt = Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inflation rate. The intra-temporal optimality condition
for the trade-off between labor and consumption is given by:
χHηt
C−σt
= Wt (2)
Wholesale Firms: The wholesale sector is populated by a continuum of competitive
firms, each being operated by a risk-neutral entrepreneur which are indexed by i. Each
wholesale firm produces a homogeneous good according to a production function that is
linear in labor
Yi,t = At ωi,tHi,t
where ωi,t is an idiosyncratic productivity shock, Hi,t is firm-specific labor input, and At
is an aggregate productivity shock which follows an exogenous AR(1) process:
At
A
=
(
At−1
A
)ρa
eεa,t (3)
with A = 1 and εa,t being a white-noise shock.
Following Ravenna and Walsh (2006), workers have to be paid before production such
that entrepreneurs need to obtain external financing before observing the idiosyncratic
productivity shock (but after observing the aggregate shock). At the time of obtaining
the external financing, entrepreneurs have available real internal funds of Ni,t obtained
by equity financing, which is described in more detail below. In order to hire workers at
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the market-determined wage, entrepreneurs thus need to acquire a loan Li,t given by:
Li,t ≥ WtHi,t −Ni,t
Entrepreneurs borrow at a financial intermediary at the loan rate RLt . The banking sector
is assumed to be competitive, with banks using collected household deposits to finance
the loans to firms. Facing a common wage determined on the labor market, the cost
minimization of each wholesale firm is hence given by
min
Hi,t
WtHi,tR
L
t
s.t. ωi,tAtHi,t ≥
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−
Yt
where the right-hand-side of the constraint is the retailer’s demand for good i under mo-
nopolistic competition, to be described further below. As the good produced by whole-
sale firms is homogeneous, aggregating the resulting first-order conditions across firms is
straightforward and yields aggregate real marginal costs MCt given by
MCt =
RLt Wt
At
(4)
In the cost-channel model by Ravenna and Walsh (2006), the loan rate is simply given by
the gross nominal rate as set by the central bank. Here, I model a financial friction that
generates a spread between the loan rate and the nominal interest rate. As in Bernanke
et al. (1999) and De Fiore and Tristani (2013), the source of the financial friction is a
costly state verification problem a` la Townsend (1979) between firm’s and banks. More
specifically, the idiosyncratic productivity shock ωi,t materializes after production and is
assumed to be private information of the entrepreneur, while aggregate technology At
is publicly observed. The bank can only observe the idiosyncratic output of firms after
production by paying monitoring costs ζ proportional to output. As shown by De Fiore
and Tristani (2013), the costly state verification problem gives rise to a standard debt
contract, which specifies that entrepreneur and financial intermediary share the wholesale
profit. In particular, the debt contract is characterized by a threshold value for the
idiosyncratic shock ω¯t defined by:
ω¯tAtHt = R
L
t (WtHt −Nt) (5)
If the realization of ωi,t ≥ ω¯t, the firm repays its debt and the bank does not monitor
the firm. If ωi,t < ω¯t, the firm defaults, the bank decides to monitor the firm, pays the
monitoring cost and seizes the remaining fraction of output. In the Appendix, I show
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that the contract implies that the credit spread evolves according to
RLt
Rt
= s
(
Nt
WtHt
)
(6)
with s′() < 0, i.e. the credit spread is positively related to entrepreneur leverage. Intu-
itively, if the level of available internal funds is low relative to the wage bill, leverage is
high and it is more likely that the entrepreneur is not able to repay. As such, higher
leverage of the entrepreneur raises the probability of default and hence the riskiness of
the loan contract for the financial intermediary. As a compensation, the financial inter-
mediary requires a mark-up such that the loan rate increases in leverage. In particular,
it decreases in the amount of internal funds that entrepreneurs have available prior to
production.
To conclude the description of the financial contract, note that the share of output
accruing to the financial intermediary is given by
g(ω¯t, ζ) =
Rt(WtHt −Nt)
AtHt
(7)
and the entrepreneur’s share is:
f(ω¯t) = 1− g(ω¯t, ζ)− ζ
∫ ω¯t
0
ωtΦdω (8)
Stockholders: I follow the lines of Boehl (2017), who assumes that entrepreneurs issue
equity on the stock market. Stocks are priced by financial traders associated with the
financial intermediary according to the expected dividend. Keeping in mind that the
costs of financing for financial intermediaries are given by the nominal interest rate on
deposits and imposing no arbitrage, the stock price St is then given by
St = Nt
Et[R
S
t+1]
Rt
(9)
where RSt+1 denotes the return on equity. In equilibrium, with risk-neutral entrepreneurs
being indifferent between increasing or decreasing the loan volume, it must hold that the
costs of equity financing equals the cost of external financing:
Et[R
S
t+1] = R
L
t (10)
To facilitate the analysis, I assume that stockholders can monitor and liquidate wholesale
firms without costs (see Boehl, 2017). I furthermore assume that entrepreneur consump-
tion is taxed by the government at an arbitrarily large rate. As a result, entrepreneurs
maximize the return on equity and are willing to distribute all their profits to stockhold-
ers as dividends, since any profit kept for consumption purposes would be taxed away. In
turn, stockholders distribute their profits as lump-sum transfers to households. From the
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financial contract, the return on equity is given by a share of output f(ω¯t)Yt. Accordingly,
financial traders attach a price of
St =
f(ω¯t)Yt
Rt
(11)
In the Appendix, I show that internal funds of entrepreneurs then evolve according to
Nt = g (Yt, Rt) (12)
with ∂Nt
∂Yt
> 0, ∂Nt
∂Rt
< 0, i.e. equity financing is pro-cyclical and depends negatively on
nominal interest rates.
In contrast to the standard setup in Bernanke et al. (1999) and the labor-variant used
by De Fiore and Tristani (2013) – where entrepreneur net worth is being accumulated
internally over time via retained profits – I hence model entrepreneur net worth as stem-
ming from equity financing as in Boehl (2017). I furthermore abstract from entrepreneur
consumption by assuming that they are fully taxed and can be liquidated at any time and
thus distribute all profits as dividends to stockholders. While these modeling choices may
seem as strong assumptions, they allow to keep the model setup analytically tractable by
avoiding that equity becomes an endogenous state variable. As shown further below, this
setup gives rise to a counter-cyclical entrepreneur leverage being relevant for marginal
costs. In turn, this preserves the canonical financial accelerator mechanism.
Retail Firms: A continuum of retailers indexed by j buys wholesale output from en-
trepreneurs on the competitive wholesale market, taking the wholesale price as given.
Wholesale goods are differentiated by retailers at no cost and sold to households. Oper-
ating in a monopolistically competitive market, each retailer j has some market power
and sets a price Pj,t. Following Calvo (1983), each retail firm is subject to staggered
pricing, i.e. may not change its price with probability θ each period. Retail firms are
owned by the representative households, such that the price setting problem is given by:
max
Pj,t
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βθ)s
u′(Ct+s)
u′(Ct)
(
Pj,t
Pt+s
(Yj,t+s −MCt+s)
)
s.t. Yj,t+s =
(
Pj,s
Pt+s
)−
Yt+s
Each retail firm maximizes the expected discounted stream of profits, subject to the
price rigidity and the demand for its individual good, which stems from household cost
minimization. The solution to this optimization problem specifies that all retailers that
can adjust prices set the same price, which is given by:
P ∗t =

− 1
Et
∑∞
s=0(βθ)
su′(Ct+s)MCt+sP t+sYt+s
Et
∑∞
s=0(βθ)
su′(Ct+s)P −1t+s Yt+s
(13)
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The aggregate price level then follows:
P 1−t = θP
1−
t−1 + (1− θ)(P ∗t )1− (14)
Market Equilibrium and Monetary Policy: The final output good is a CES com-
posite of individual retail goods:
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Y
−1

j,t dj
) 
−1
Market clearing in the goods market and in the labor market requires that
Yt = Ct (15)
and
Yt =
AtHt
Dt
(16)
where Dt is a measure of price dispersion given by:
Dt =
∫ 1
0
Pj,t
Pt
−
dj = (1− θ)
(
1− θΠ−1t
1− θ
) 
−1
+ θΠtDt−1 (17)
To close the model, let the central bank set the nominal interest rate Rt, either as a
result of an optimal policy optimization problem or following a Taylor-type policy rule.
In the latter case, which will be used as a simple benchmark for optimal discretionary
policy, the policy rule is simply specified as:
Rt
R
=
(
Πt
Π
)φpi
(18)
To summarize, the model’s aggregate dynamics are characterized by Equations (1)-
(18) for variables Yt, Ct, Ht, MCt,Wt, Rt, Pt, P
∗
t ,Πt, Dt, R
L
t , R
S
t , Nt, St, ω¯t, g(ω¯t, ζ), f(ω¯t)
and the sole aggregate shock At. Equations (1)-(3) and (13)-(17) are standard and shared
with the classic New Keynesian DSGE model, while Equations (4)-(12) describe the
financial accelerator.
2.2 Linearized Model
To facilitate the analytic analysis of the model, I consider the linearized version of the
model. I log-linearize Equations (1)-(17) around the non-stochastic steady state and
denote variables in percentage deviations from steady state with lower case letters (xt =
log(Xt)− log(X)). This yields the following linearized equations for the household sector:
yt = −σ−1 (rt − Et[pit+1]) + Et[yt+1] (19)
wt = ηht + σyt (20)
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Both the Euler Equation (19) and the intra-temporal trade-off between labor supply and
consumption (20) are standard. Moving to the firm sector, the aggregate production
function in linear terms is simply given by:
yt = at + ht (21)
The Calvo pricing problem gives rise to a standard New Keynesian Phillips curve
pit = κmct + βEt[pit+1] (22)
where κ = (1−θβ)(1−θ)
θ
. Marginal costs are given by
mct = wt + ϑr
L
t − at (23)
where I introduce the parameter ϑ as an indicator that governs the presence of the cost
channel. With ϑ = 1, firms have to pay the entire wage bill in advance of production such
that the loan rate enters marginal costs one-for-one. ϑ = 0 eliminates the cost channel
and reverts the model back to the standard framework. This allows a straightforward
comparison of the financial accelerator economy and the standard New Keynesian frame-
work in the optimal monetary policy analysis below.
The credit spread specified by the financial contract is given by:
rLt − rt = ν(wt + ht − nt) (24)
The sensitivity of the credit spread with respect to leverage in Equation (24) is captured
by ν > 0. An increase in leverage by one percent thus triggers an increase in the spread
by ν percent. Finally, as shown in the Appendix, equity is given by:
nt = ψyt − µrt (25)
The elasticities of equity financing with respect to output and the nominal interest rate
are governed by ψ and µ, respectively. Lastly, for the reference case where the central
bank follows a Taylor rule, this is given in linear terms by:
rt = φpipit (26)
2.3 Model Properties
This section is devoted to gaining intuition into the dynamic properties of the model, in
particular to how the introduction of financial frictions alters the economy in comparison
to the standard New Keynesian model. For that purpose, it is possible to reduce the
amount of equations to obtain a more parsimonious representation that is more insightful
and directly comparable to the standard framework. As a starting point, note that output
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in the efficient economy, which is the counterfactual economy in which prices are flexible
and financial frictions are absent, is given by:
yet =
1 + η
σ + η
at (27)
Let us furthermore denote the output gap with respect to this economy as:
xt = yt − yet (28)
By making use of Equations (27)-(28) and combining Equations (19)-(25), one can rewrite
the model as:
xt = −σ−1 (rt − Et[pit+1]) + Et[xt+1]− ϕat (29)
pit = K xt + ϑκ(1 + νµ) rt + βEt[pit+1]− ϑνκφ at (30)
where K, ϕ and φ are parameters described below. The small-scale nature of the model
and the assumptions made for tractability purposes thus allow to characterize the model
in three equations only: The Euler equation (29) in terms of the output gap, a financial-
frictions-augmented Phillips curve (30) and a specification of the nominal interest rate as
set by the central bank.
Despite its simplicity, this framework captures three key characteristics of many state-
of-the art financial frictions models. First, the macroeconomic effects of structural shocks
are amplified, as the financial accelerator alters their transmission channels. In this
baseline version of the model, the only aggregate shocks are technology shocks at. As in
the standard model, positive technology shocks appear negatively in the Euler equation,
where the strength is governed by the coefficient
ϕ ≡ (1 + η)(1− ρa)
σ + η
(31)
A positive realization of the technology shock at raises current output from the supply
side, thus requiring a fall in the real interest rate to induce a corresponding rise in
demand today. Under financial frictions, technology shocks unfold additional effects. As
seen in Equation (30), technology shocks also enter in the Phillips curve in the financial
accelerator economy, where the coefficient φ is given by:
φ ≡ (1 + η)
σ + η
(ψ − 1) (32)
To understand the economic interpretation of this result, it is useful to state a mild
assumption on the pro-cyclicality of equity financing:
Assumption 1 The elasticity of equity financing with respect to output is larger than
one: ψ > 1.
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Lemma 1 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). Under Assumption 1,
positive technology shocks induce endogenous negative cost-push effects that amplify the
expansionary output response.
The intuition for this finding is straightforward. With financial frictions, a technology
shock affects both sides of the entrepreneur’s balance sheet. On the one hand, a positive
technology shock raises the loan size one-for-one, as labor demand increases for a given
wage. On the other hand, the expansionary effect also increases available equity financing
via higher expected profits. The total effect on leverage is thus in principle ambiguous,
with the size depending on ψ. If ψ is larger than one as specified in Assumption 1, the
latter effect of pro-cyclical equity financing dominates. As a result, entrepreneur leverage
is counter-cyclical in response to technology shocks, translating into a counter-cyclical
credit spread. In turn, technology shocks generate additional negative cost-push effects,
which decrease inflation further through lower marginal costs. Finally, the lower marginal
costs act as a financial accelerator and increase the expansionary effect of the productivity
shock on output.7
A second feature of the financial accelerator economy is a change in inflation dynamics.
In the financial-frictions-augmented Phillips curve given by Equation (30), the slope with
respect to the slope of the Phillips curve with respect to the output gap is given by
K ≡ κ(σ + η + ϑν(1 + σ + η − ψ)) (33)
Let us state another assumption on the pro-cyclicality of equity financing:
Assumption 2 The elasticity of equity financing with respect to output satisfies ψ >
1 + σ + η.
While Assumption (2) is slightly more restrictive than Assumption (1), it is nevertheless
a rather mild assumption.8 With this assumption, we can postulate the following:
Lemma 2 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). Under Assumption 2,
the Phillips curve with respect to the output gap flattens relative to the standard New
Keynesian framework.
To gain some intuition for this result, consider the standard model first, which implies
for ν = ϑ = 0 such that the slope of the Phillips curve is given by K = κ(σ + η). In this
case, marginal costs are simply given by a function of wages and aggregate productivity
(see Equation 23). Suppose that for whatever reason, wholesale firms want to expand
production. This requires them to hire more labor and to pay households a higher wage
7For ψ < 1, the framework can also accommodate the notion that the financial sector may shield the
macroeconomy from disturbances, i.e. act as a ”financial decelerator” as in Gerali et al. (2010).
8For example, under log-utility in consumption such that σ = 1 and the borderline case of no disutility
in labor η = 0, the elasticity only needs to exceed 2.
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(given some level of technology), as seen in Equation (20). This raises marginal costs by
(σ + η)−1, depending on the elasticities of labor supply and the degree of inter-temporal
consumption smoothing which determine the household’s intra-temporal consumption-
labor trade-off.
This contrasts to the case where financial frictions are present, in which case the
increased labor demand and wages require the entrepreneur to acquire a larger loan to
pay workers in advance. This translates into an increase of leverage and a higher loan
rate. As a consequence, marginal costs increase by more than in the standard model.
However, the higher output also raises expected dividends and thus allows entrepreneurs
to raise more equity, thus decreasing leverage, which counteracts the first effect. Under
Assumption 2, equity financing is sufficiently pro-cyclical such that the second channel
dominates. Accordingly, the slope of the Phillips curve is flatter than in the standard
model without financial frictions.
A third characteristic of the financial accelerator economy refers to forward-looking
behavior. This can be seen by iterating the Phillips curve given in Equation (30) forward
to obtain:
pit = K
∞∑
s=0
βsEt[xt+s] + ϑκ(1 + νµ)
∞∑
s=0
βsEt[rt+s] + ϑν
φ
1− βρaat (34)
Lemma 3 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). Then, expectations of future
nominal interest rates matter directly for current inflation dynamics.
As evident from this equation, financial frictions increases the degree to which forward-
looking behavior matters for current period inflation dynamics. In the standard model,
nominal interest rates are set by the central bank to influence household behavior via the
Euler curve, taking their expectations of future inflation and output gap into account.
With the financial accelerator, however, nominal interest rates directly affect marginal
costs as well by increasing the loan rate that entrepreneurs have to repay. On the one
hand, there is a direct one-to-one increase in the loan rate as the higher nominal interest
rate is equivalent to higher funding costs of financial intermediaries via deposits. On
the other hand, the increase in nominal interest rates also reduces the available equity
financing, such that entrepreneur leverage increases, in turn raising the credit spread by
further. As such, retail firms take current and future expected nominal interest rates into
account when making their pricing decisions as these constitute important components
of current and future expected marginal costs.
Taken together, these three characteristics of the financial accelerator economy imply
that macroeconomic dynamics are fundamentally different. As an illustration, consider
a positive technology shock, as shown in Figure 1. The impulse responses should be
understood as illustrative and are obtained under a standard calibration that satisfies
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Figure 1: Technology Shock
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Note: Impulse response functions for a technology shock with an autoregressive coefficient of
0.9. The shock size is calibrated to yield a one-percent increase of output under the Taylor
rule in the NK model. All variables are in percentage deviations from the non-stochastic
steady state, except for inflation and interest rate which are in percentage-point deviations.
A period is a quarter, NK is the standard New Keynesian model (in black) and FF (in red) is
the financial accelerator economy.
Assumption 2, with the central bank following a Taylor rule.9 The size of the shock
is calibrated such that output expands by one percent in the standard New Keynesian
model. In the absence of financial frictions, the technology shock act reduces marginal
costs and hence inflation directly. The output gap is negative due to the presence of price
stickiness. The central bank reacts to the deflationary pressure by reducing the nominal
interest rate.
In the financial accelerator economy, the positive technology shock unfolds endogenous
negative cost-push effects, as shown in the lower left panel. The financial accelerator
mechanism operates through a pronounced pro-cyclicality of net worth, in turn generating
a counter-cyclical credit spread. This leads to a further decrease of marginal costs and
inflation. As a result, the output effect is accelerated and the output gap is positive. With
financial frictions, inflation and output gap thus move in opposite directions following
technology shocks.
Let us summarize the model description. The proposed framework is a small-scale
9A more detailed description of the calibration is outlined in Section 4.3 for the numerical comparison
of discretionary policy to the case of commitment.
15
New Keynesian DSGE model with a financial accelerator mechanism. The tractability of
the linearized model allows to characterize the economy in three equations only. While the
Euler equation and the monetary policy specification are unchanged, financial frictions
alter the Phillips curve in three ways. First, technology shocks unfold endogenous cost-
push effects, such that their expansionary effects are amplified. Second, the slope of the
Phillips curve with respect to the output gap decreases because of a counter-cyclical credit
spread. Third, expectations of future nominal interest rate matter for current inflation
dynamics as they directly affect marginal costs. While being relatively simplistic, the
model hence incorporates the key characteristics of many more complex financial frictions
models and implies substantially different macroeconomic dynamics compared to the
standard model.
3 Welfare Approximation
As shown above, the presence of financial frictions fundamentally changes the economy’s
characteristics, which has crucial implications for the optimal behavior of central banks.
The predominant and overarching question for the design of optimal monetary policy is
the mandate that central banks should pursue. In the present context, this amounts to
asking whether financial frictions imply a different welfare-optimal central bank mandate
compared to the standard framework. In other words, what is the welfare-optimal man-
date in the financial accelerator economy, and (how) is it different from the standard
case?
When thinking about the optimal central bank mandate, it is standard to assume
that the central bank is benevolent and thus aims to maximize welfare. Following this
notion, one can interpret the maximization of household utility as the relevant mandate
for central banks. The seminal contributions by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and
Benigno and Woodford (2004) show that a second-order approximation of household
welfare in the standard New Keynesian model yields a quadratic policy objective in
inflation and output. This finding has been widely interpreted as theoretical support for
a central bank mandate consisting of stabilizing inflation and economic activity only, and
in particular for inflation targeting.10
To investigate whether the presence of financial frictions requires a non-standard
central bank mandate in the model at hand, I thus first follow the literature and derive a
second-order Taylor approximation of household utility around the deterministic steady
state. The steady-state output level of the financial accelerator economy Y FF is given
10This result also supported the ”Jackson Hole consensus” (Bean et al., 2010; Bernanke and Gertler,
1995). According to this view, central banks should not directly be concerned with financial stability, and
(systematically) reacting to asset prices and other financial market measures is considered unnecessary
at best. Following this notion, maintaining price stability is considered the best a central bank can do
to contribute to financial stability.
16
by:
Y FF =
[
χ−1
(

− 1
)−1 (
RL
)−ϑ] 1σ+η
(35)
This shows that steady-state output in the financial frictions economy is low because of
two inefficiencies. First, as in the standard model, monopolistic competition in the retail
market implies that all firms charge a mark-up /( − 1) over marginal costs. Second,
the presence of financial frictions means that marginal costs are inefficiently high as
entrepreneurs need to lend at the rate RL to pay workers in advance. The mark-up and
the loan rate generate a wedge between household’s marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and consumption and the marginal product of labor, which is given by aggregate
productivity. Following Gal´ı et al. (2007), we can label this wedge as the inefficiency gap.
Lemma 4 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). The inefficiency gap be-
tween the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal product of labor is given by
χHη
C−σ
A−1 =
(

− 1
)−1 (
RL
)−ϑ
(36)
In the following, however, I assume that there are some steady-state subsidies τ to firm’s
marginal costs such that the steady-state of the financial accelerator economy is efficient
and coincides with the one of the standard model. This is a standard assumption in the
literature made to facilitate the analysis.
Assumption 3 The government issues steady-state subsidies τ = 
−1(R
L)ϑ to firm’s
marginal cost.
Lemma 5 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). Under Assumption 3,
the governments corrects for the two steady-state distortions generated by monopolistic
competition and financial frictions such that the steady-state is efficient and given by
Y FF =
[
χ−1τ
(

− 1
)−1 (
RL
)−ϑ] 1σ+η
= χ−
1
σ+η = Y NK (37)
Under this assumption, I derive the second-order approximation of household welfare,
which yields the following result:
Proposition 1 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). Under Assumption 3,
one can approximate household welfare Wt as
Wt = Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
(
Ut+s − U
UcC
)
≈ −1
2
Et
∞∑
s=0
βsLt+s (38)
where the period-by-period loss function is given by
Lt = pi2t + λ
(
xft −
ϑ
σ + η
rft −
ϑν
σ + η
levft
)2
(39)
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where
λ ≡ κ(σ + η)

(40)
and
xft = yt − yft (41)
levft = w
f
t + h
f
t − nft (42)
and variables with superscript f refer to the flexible-price financial accelerator economy.
Proof. See Appendix.
As in the standard model, household welfare can be approximated by a loss function
that looks like a traditional central bank mandate and prescribes inflation and output
stabilization. In the financial accelerator economy, the economic stabilization motive
consists of stabilizing the output gap with respect to the flexible-price economy (xft )
and mitigating fluctuations in the nominal interest rate and entrepreneur leverage. The
latter mandate refers to flexible-price variables and is equivalent to the dynamic wedge
between flexible-price output and the efficient level of output introduced by the financial
accelerator.11
Lemma 6 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). The dynamic output wedge
between the financial accelerator economy without nominal rigidities and the fully efficient
economy is given by:
yft − yet = −
ϑ
σ + η
rft −
ϑν
σ + η
levft = −
ϑ
σ + η
rL,ft (43)
As outlined above, the presence of financial frictions implies a wedge between wages and
the marginal product of labor via the need of entrepreneurs to lend at the rate RLt . This
wedge is not solely present in the steady-state, but persists when the economy is hit
by shocks. Keeping in mind that the loan rate is counter-cyclical under Assumption 2,
Lemma 6 shows that the wedge is pro-cyclical, which again underlines the financial ac-
celerator mechanism.
How should one interpret these findings? In particular, do they imply that optimal
central bank mandates are fundamentally different in the presence of financial frictions?
In the financial accelerator economy at hand, the answer is clearly no. The new mandate
elements, relative to the standard model, refer to the wedge between flexible-price econ-
omy and the efficient level of output. Yet, a central bank in control of the nominal interest
11This dynamic wedge is not covered by the steady-state subsidy to marginal costs. For the price
stickiness wedge, it is a well-known result that first-best policy consists of an appropriate dynamic
subsidy to marginal costs to eliminate this wedge (see Correia et al., 2008). However, this is not the
focus of the paper at hand. Yet, it should be noted that this conveys an interesting notion of dynamic
macroprudential policy in the context of the financial accelerator economy. Investigating this issue is left
to future research.
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rate is only able to influence fluctuations of the economy relative to the flexible-price econ-
omy directly. In other words, the new mandate is independent of monetary policy as the
nominal rate in the counterfactual flexible-price economy adjusts endogenously.12
We can also see this by rewriting the mandate in terms of the output gap with respect
to the efficient output prevailing in a counterfactual economy with flexible prices and
without financial frictions.
Lemma 7 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). The loss function obtained
by approximating household welfare to a second order can be written as
Lt = pi2t + λx2t (44)
where again
λ =
κ(σ + η)

(45)
and
xt = yt − yet = yt −
1 + η
σ + η
at (46)
In other words, the loss function representing household welfare in the financial accelerator
economy is almost identical to the one of the standard small-scale New Keynesian DSGE
model. Even the relative weight between inflation and output gap stabilization λ is
the same. The only minor difference is the interpretation of the output gap. In the
standard model, the relevant output gap is the one between the actual economy and the
flexible-price counterpart, as shown by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Benigno
and Woodford (2004). As price stickiness is the only source of inefficiency in this model,
the flexible-price economy is also efficient. In the financial accelerator economy, the
appropriate reference for welfare considerations is again the efficient economy, which is
the economy at hand in the absence of nominal rigidities and financial frictions.
What is the intuition behind this result? As in the standard New Keynesian model,
the first driver of welfare losses is inflation volatility. Variability in inflation causes welfare
losses, because the nominal rigidities embodied in the Calvo pricing leads to price disper-
sion across retail firms. This entails a loss of efficiency in production. The second source
of welfare losses are deviations of output from the first-best allocation in the absence
of nominal rigidities and further frictions. The presence of the financial accelerator is
equivalent to such a further friction and thus drives a wedge between efficient output and
output in the counterfactual flexible-price economy. This wedge is, however, independent
of monetary policy controlling the nominal interest rate, which only has an effect in the
12As such, these mandates may be interpreted as providing a mandate for fiscal or macroprudential
policymakers. If these operate instruments that directly affect leverage in the flexible-price economy,
they may be able to close the wedge to the efficient level of output. As the focus of the paper is on
optimal monetary policy in the presence of financial frictions, I abstract from fiscal or macroprudential
policies in the following.
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sticky price economy. A monetary policymaker thus may equivalently cast the problem
in the canonical form of minimizing the variability of inflation and the output gap with
respect to the efficient allocation. This result extends the finding of Ravenna and Walsh
(2006) for the cost channel economy to the case of financial frictions.
Before proceeding, it is worthwhile to discuss the similarities and differences of these
results to the previous literature. Proposition 1 shows that the loss function can be written
as a traditional mandate of stabilizing inflation and the output gap, where in particular
the weight on the output gap relative to inflation is not altered by the presence financial
frictions. The prevailing traditional monetary policy mandate is in line with findings by
Carlstrom et al. (2010), De Fiore and Tristani (2013), Cu´rdia and Woodford (2016) and
Paoli and Paustian (2017).
However, these papers find that a second-order approximation of household welfare
under financial frictions gives rise to additional policy objectives, which one might loosely
categorize as financial stability considerations.13 This difference can be traced back to
a different set of modelling assumptions. De Fiore and Tristani (2013) explicitly track
entrepreneur consumption, and find that this gives rise to a mandate for smoothing
the credit spread. However, this mandate is quantitatively far less important than the
traditional mandate for their benchmark calibration. In the model at hand, I abstract
entirely from entrepreneur consumption by assuming that they distribute all their profits
as dividends to stockholders, which in turn distribute their profits as lump-sum transfers
to households. With this assumption, the policy mandate obtained by De Fiore and
Tristani (2013) is identical to the one I obtain.
Cu´rdia and Woodford (2016) model heterogeneity in the household discount factor,
such that the economy is populated by savers and borrowers. The required financial
intermediation is assumed to be inefficient and to generate credit spreads. As outlined
by Cu´rdia and Woodford (2016), additional financial stability considerations vanish from
the policy mandate only if one assumes that financial frictions are exogenous. Here, for
a different type of financial friction and in a homogeneous agent framework, I obtain
a slightly different result: Even with endogenous financial frictions (generated by ν),
the policy mandate can be written in canonical form. Lastly, the key differentiating
assumption in Carlstrom et al. (2010) and Paoli and Paustian (2017) is the presence of
an additional term in household utility in their analysis, which the authors interpret as
costs of variable capital utilization. When obtaining the welfare approximation, this gives
rise to a financial stability mandate to minimize credit cycles.
13These models, like the framework at hand, do not feature a prominent role of financial intermedi-
aries, and are hence silent about the effects of their default and systemic risk within the financial sector.
Following Angelini et al. (2014), one may interpret the stabilization of financial market outcomes pre-
scribed in these models as an intermediate target for policymakers. Lowering volatilities of leverage and
spreads within financial markets is generally deemed to reduce systemic risk and may therefore be seen
as contributing to financial stability.
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To summarize, I abstract from entrepreneur consumption and consumer heterogeneity,
while at the same time assuming standard household preferences. In the absence of
these assumptions made in the previous literature, the presence of financial frictions
does not alter the central bank mandate obtained by a second-order household welfare
approximation. Even the relative weight on output gap volatility is identical to the
standard case. Put differently, without making additional assumptions and taking the
conventional view on central banks as controlling the nominal interest rate, stabilization
of inflation and output gap prevails as appropriate central bank mandate in the presence
of financial frictions. With these finding in mind, the next section turns to optimal
discretionary monetary policy.
4 Financial Frictions and the Conduct of Monetary
Policy
While the mandate of central banks is not substantially altered in the presence of finan-
cial frictions, we have seen in Section 2.3 that the financial accelerator economy implies
fundamentally different macroeconomic dynamics. In light of these findings, it is need-
less to say that one should expect that this requires a different monetary policy stance
compared to the standard framework. This is particularly the case if the central bank
lacks a credible commitment device, thus operating under discretion and being unable to
influence the more relevant forward-looking behavior of agents. Against this backdrop,
I investigate the design of optimal discretionary monetary policy within the financial
accelerator in the following.
4.1 The Inflationary Bias under Discretion
Discretion constitutes a natural starting point for an analysis of optimal monetary pol-
icy, as it imposes minimal requirements on the credibility of the central bank. Under
discretion, the monetary policymaker cannot pre-commit to future actions and is hence
unable to manipulate private sector expectations. The central bank hence re-optimizes
every period, taking private sector expectations as given.
I first solve for optimal discretionary policy under discretion using the mandate ob-
tained from the approximation of household welfare in the previous section. In each
period, the central bank’s optimization problem under discretion consists of minimizing
the loss function by setting the nominal interest rate, taking expectations as given. We
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can hence write the optimization problem as:
min
pit,xt,rt
Lt = pi2t + λx2t (47)
s.t. xt = −σ−1 (rt − Et[pit+1]) + Et[xt+1]− ϕat (48)
pit = K xt + ϑκ(1 + νµ) rt + βEt[pit+1]− ϑνκφ at (49)
where the parameters λ,K, ϕ and φ are defined as above. The first-order condition for
the nominal interest rate yields
− σ−1Θt = ϑκ(1 + νµ)Λt (50)
where Θ and Λ are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the Euler equation and the
Phillips curve, respectively. In contrast to the standard model, this implies that the
Euler equation poses a constraint to the policymaker since Θt 6= 0 as long as Λt = pit 6= 0.
A given change in the nominal interest affects not only the output gap via the Euler
equation, but also marginal costs through the Phillips curve. A policymaker facing a
trade-off between inflation and output gap stabilization needs to take this into account.14
This leads us to the following result for the optimal targeting rule under discretion:
Proposition 2 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). The optimal targeting
rule for monetary policy under discretion is given by
pit = −λ
κ˜
xt (51)
where
κ˜ = κ[σ + η − ϑσ + ϑν(1 + σ + η − ψ − µσ)] (52)
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that the optimal targeting rule nests the corresponding solution for the standard
model (ϑ = ν = 0), which is given by
pit = − λ
κ(σ + η)
xt (53)
In order to understand the targeting rule, it is worthwhile to investigate the transmission
channels of monetary policy in the financial accelerator economy. For the time being, let
us thus consider a monetary policy shock.
With financial frictions, a given rise in the nominal interest rate unfolds four effects:
First, it raises the real interest rate, such that households want to postpone consumption,
14A policymaker who does not care about output fluctuations and thus places a zero weight on the
output gap (λ = 0) will ignore the Euler equation in the financial accelerator economy as well. But as
shown in the previous section, the welfare approximation implies λ > 0.
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leading to a fall in the output gap and inflation via the Euler equation. (Euler channel).
Aside from this standard effect, a second factor supply channel arises as households
accordingly reduce labor supply to accommodate the lower desired production. This
decreases wages and tends to decrease leverage, marginal costs and thus inflation further.
Both Euler and factor supply channels are governed by the elasticity of inter-temporal
substitution σ and the elasticity of labor supply η, while the factor-supply channel also
depends on the sensitivity of loan rate with respect to leverage. Third, marginal costs
increase directly via the higher nominal interest rate (cost channel governed by σ), even
absent changes to labor demand or wages. Fourth, equity financing decreases, both due
to the fall in output (ψ) and due to the direct effect of the nominal interest rate (µσ).
The latter equity channel and the cost channel effect imply an increase in inflation and
thus counteract the first two channels.
Let us now return to the targeting rule under discretion. The considerations of a
monetary policy shock allows us to rewrite the targeting rule as:
− λxt = κ[ σ + η︸ ︷︷ ︸
Euler channel
− ϑσ︸︷︷︸
cost channel
+ ϑν(1 + σ + η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
factor-supply channel
−ϑν(ψ + µσ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
equity channel
] pit (54)
In turn, we can postulate the following:
Lemma 8 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). Under Assumption 2, the
cost channel and the equity channel of monetary policy dominate its factor-supply channel.
Lemma 9 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). Under Assumption 2, the
targeting rule for monetary policy under discretion prescribes a more aggressive reaction
of the output gap to inflation relative to the standard model.
These results show that – under a reasonable assumption on the pro-cyclicality of equity
financing – the overall power of discretionary monetary policy to influence both inflation
and output gap at the same time is limited in the financial accelerator economy. The
presence of financial frictions leads to a weaker effect of monetary policy shocks on output,
but a larger impact on inflation.In other words, stabilizing inflation is more costly in terms
of the output gap because the factor-supply channel is dominated by the cost channel
and the equity channel. As a result, the central bank needs to move the nominal interest
rate (and thus the output gap) by more than in the standard model for given inflation,
which is mirrored in the more aggressive targeting rule under discretion.
The finding of weaker macroeconomic effects of monetary policy shocks is in contrast
to the canonical financial accelerator mechanism in Bernanke et al. (1999). In their
model, monetary policy shock effects on both output and inflation are amplified. The
difference can be traced back to the absence of capital in the model at hand. The
factor-supply channel for capital in the original financial accelerator is stronger, because
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a higher demand for capital increases investment and the price of capital. In turn, this
raises entrepreneur net worth, driving down the external finance premium and stimulating
further investment, enforcing the factor-supply channel. As a result, the overall effect of
monetary policy shocks is amplified. This kind of multiplier effect is substantially weaker
if the financial accelerator refers to labor. Accordingly, in the labor financial accelerator
economy at hand, the factor-supply channel outweighs the cost channel and the equity
channel only for unreasonably low elasticities of substitution, high elasticities of labor
supply and a high sensitivity of the credit spread to entrepreneur leverage.
What does the more aggressive targeting rule under discretion imply for macroeco-
nomic dynamics under discretion? The tractability of the framework allows to use the
optimal targeting rule to obtain a closed-form solution in terms of shocks only, as shown
in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). The dynamics of
inflation, output gap and nominal interest rate under optimal discretionary policy are
given by
pit = −λϑκ νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)
κ˜2 + λ(1− ρaβ˜)
at (55)
xt = −ϑκκ˜ νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)
κ˜2 + λ(1− ρaβ˜)
at (56)
rt = −ϑκγ νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)
κ˜2 + λ(1− ρaβ˜)
at − σϕ at (57)
where
β˜ = β + ϑκ(1 + νµ)
(
1− κ˜σ
λ
)
(58)
γ = λρa + (1− ρa)σκ˜ (59)
Proof. See Appendix.
As before, the analytic solution nests the case of the standard model for ϑ = ν = 0,
which serves as a benchmark:
pit = = 0 (60)
xt = = 0 (61)
rt = −σϕ at (62)
In the absence of financial frictions, optimal discretionary monetary policy is able to
perfectly stabilize both inflation and output gap. This can be achieved by appropriately
varying the interest rate in response to the pure demand shock component of technology
shocks; this corresponds to the second term in Equation (57) and the one left in Equa-
tion (62). In the financial accelerator economy, however, it is straightforward to see that
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technology shocks have a non-zero effect on inflation and the output gap. In turn, we
can postulate:
Lemma 10 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). In the presence of financial
frictions, divine coincidence does not hold and discretionary policy fails to perfectly offset
technology shocks (inflationary bias).
The breakdown of divine coincidence is a result of the shock amplification implied
by the financial accelerator. As outlined in Lemma 1, positive technology shocks induce
endogenous negative cost-push effects that amplify the expansionary output response.
These cost-push effects act like mark-up shocks, moving inflation and output gap in op-
posite directions. As a consequence, monetary policy is not able to stabilize inflation and
output gap at the same time, facing a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and output
gap (where the output gap fluctuates inefficiently due to the financial accelerator). In
turn, this implies that macroeconomic stabilization by the central bank under discretion
is sub-optimal relative to the standard model. Because technology shocks then lead to
non-zero inflation in the presence of financial frictions, I refer to this sub-optimality as
inflationary bias of discretionary policy.
Turning to the determinants of the inflationary bias in further detail, let us investigate
the components of the analytic solutions in Propositon 3. The dynamics of inflation,
output gap and the interest rate all depend on a common coefficient α given by:
α ≡ νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)
κ˜2 + λ(1− ρaβ˜)
(63)
Key components of α are thus the slope of the Phillips curve κ˜ and the degree of forward-
looking behavior β˜ under discretionary policy. With respect to the Phillips curve, we can
postulate the following:
Proposition 4 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). Assume further ρa = 0
and let Assumption 2 hold. Then it holds that
∂α
∂ν
> 0 (64)
∂α
∂ψ
> 0 (65)
such that the inflationary bias increases in the degree of financial frictions as captured by
ν and ψ via the flatter Phillips curve.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Under Assumption 2, the financial
accelerator leads to a flatter Phillips curve. The slope in the Phillips curve governs the
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contemporaneous relationship between inflation and output gap. If the slope is lower,
discretionary monetary policy faces a more severe trade-off between output gap and
inflation stabilization. As argued above, this implies that inflation stabilization is more
costly in terms of the output gap. As a result, the inflationary bias of discretionary
monetary policy increases in the degree of financial frictions.
In Proposition 4, the assumption ρa = 0 serves to isolate the effect of the Phillips
curve for the conduct of discretionary policy. Another driving factor of the inflationary
bias is the degree of forward-looking behavior.
Assumption 4
σ(1 + νµ)(ψ + µσ − 1− σ − η) + µ(λ− κ˜σ) > 0 (66)
For general calibrations, Assumption 4 is a slightly more restrictive assumption than
Assumption 2. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as a mild constraint on the Frisch
labor supply elasticity (η−1).15 Under no disutility of labor (η = 0), one can show that
Assumption 2 implies that Assumption 4 holds.
Proposition 5 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). It holds that
∂β˜
∂ψ
> 0 (67)
Under Assumption 4, it furthermore holds that
∂β˜
∂ν
> 0 (68)
such that the inflationary bias increases in the degree of financial frictions as captured
by ν and ψ via the higher relevance of future expectations for current inflation dynamics.
Furthermore, monetary policy reacts more aggressive to technology shocks.
Proof. See Appendix.
As shown in Lemma 3, the presence of financial frictions increases the degree to which
forward-looking behavior matters for current period inflation dynamics. As nominal
interest rates matter for current and future marginal costs, retailers pay more attention
to future expected nominal interest rates when making their pricing decisions. The fact
that discretion inherently cannot commit to setting future interest rates and hence ignores
these more relevant forward-looking elements aggravates the inflationary bias. As with
the flatter Phillips curve, this effect on the inflationary bias increases in the degree of
financial frictions.
15This yields the representation of Assumption 4 as η < σµκ+[σ(1+νµ)+νµσκ)](ψ+µσ−1−σ)µκ(2σ−1)+σ(1+νµ) , where the
right-hand-side is strictly positive under Assumption 2.
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An alternative way to illustrate the inflationary bias of discretionary policy is to
investigate the impulse responses of technology shocks, shown in Figure 2. In the standard
NK model, technology shocks only manifest as demand shocks in the Euler equation, such
that it possible and optimal under discretion to fully offset their inflationary effect and
close the output gap completely. With financial frictions, technology shocks also generate
negative mark-up effects. In turn, divine coincidence breaks down and neither inflation
nor output gap are perfectly stabilized. The expansionary effect on output is amplified
by the financial accelerator.
Figure 2: Technology Shock under Discretion
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Note: Impulse response functions for a technology shock with an autoregressive coefficient of
0.9. The shock size is calibrated to yield a one-percent increase of output under the Taylor
rule in the NK model. All variables are in percentage deviations from the non-stochastic
steady state, except for inflation and interest rate which are in percentage-point deviations.
A period is a quarter, NK is the standard New Keynesian model (in black) and FF (in red) is
the financial accelerator economy.
We can thus conclude that discretionary monetary policy suffers from an inflationary
bias in the financial accelerator economy relative to the standard model due to three fac-
tors. First, the amplification of aggregate shock entailed in the financial accelerator leads
to endogenous cost-push effects, in turn resulting in a break-down of divine coincidence.
Second, the flatter Phillips curve makes inflation stabilization for discretionary policy
more costly in terms of the output gap. Third, the higher degree of forward-looking
behavior is inherently ignored under discretion, in turn increasing the inflationary bias.
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4.2 Inflation Conservatism
As shown above, discretionary monetary policy suffers from a substantial inflation bias
in the financial accelerator economy relative to the standard economy without financial
frictions. Clearly, this is undesirable from a policy-maker’s perspective. As such, this
naturally raises the question whether policy performance can be improved in the presence
of financial frictions. Two of the three factors generating the inflationary bias are largely
beyond the control of monetary policy: The flatter Phillips curve and the amplification
of shocks, the latter leading to a breakdown of divine coincidence.
The third source of the inflationary bias is that discretionary policy inherently fails to
take private sector expectations into account. A policy that is able to manipulate private
expectations by making credible commitments may thus be advisable and more appropri-
ate than discretionary policy. However, policy commitment places strong requirements on
the credibility of central banks. This section hence asks whether the inflationary bias un-
der discretion in the face of financial frictions can be improved upon even if commitment
policies are not available.
To evaluate the performance of discretionary policy relative to a policy that takes
expectations into account, suppose that the central bank was able to credibly commit to
a simple rule of the form:
xt = ba at (69)
Lemma 11 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). Under commitment to a
simple rule of the form xt = ba at, inflation dynamics are given by
pit =
˜˜κ
1− ρa˜˜β ba at − ϑκ
νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)
1− ρa˜˜β at (70)
where ˜˜κ = κ˜+ ϑκσρ(1 + νµ) (71)˜˜β = β + ϑκ(1 + νµ) (72)
The solution under commitment to the simple rule can be rewritten by combining
Equation (69) and Equation (70) as
pit =
˜˜κ
1− ρa˜˜βxt − ϑκ
νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)
1− ρa˜˜β at (73)
which illustrates the benefits from commitment. Under commitment to the simple rule,
a contraction of the output gap leads to a contraction of inflation by
˜˜κ
1−ρβ˜
, whereas the
effect under discretion is only κ˜. By manipulating agent’s expectations about its future
actions, the central bank is able to improve upon the trade-off between inflation and
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output gap stabilization that it faces.
The optimal value of ba can be determined by the central bank by maximizing house-
hold welfare. Using the welfare approximation derived in Section 3, the central bank’s
optimization problem is given by
min
ba
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
{
pi2t+s + λx
2
t+s
}
(74)
s.t. pit =
˜˜κ
1− ρa˜˜β ba at − ϑκ
νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)
1− ρa˜˜β at (75)
xt = ba at (76)
where two constraints Equation (75) and Equation (76) capture the economic dynamics
and the functional form of the simple commitment, respectively.
Lemma 12 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). The optimal policy func-
tion with respect to technology shocks under commitment to a simple rule of the form
xt = ba at is given by:
ba = ϑκ˜˜κνφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)˜˜κ2 + λ(1− ρa˜˜β)2 (77)
Proposition 6 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). The dynamics of
inflation and the output gap and nominal interest rate under optimal commitment to a
simple rule of the form xt = ba at are given by:
pit = −λϑκ(1− ρa˜˜β)νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)˜˜κ2 + λ(1− ρa˜˜β)2 at (78)
xt = ϑκ˜˜κνφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)˜˜κ2 + λ(1− ρa˜˜β)2 at (79)
Proof. See Appendix.
To put this solution into perspective, the solution for inflation under optimal discretion
as derived in the previous section is given by:
pit = −λϑκ νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)
κ˜2 + λ(1− ρaβ˜)
at (80)
Lemma 13 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy) and assume 0 < ρa < 1.
Then it holds that ˜˜κ > κ˜ and ˜˜β > β˜ such that the response of inflation to technology shocks
is smaller under optimal commitment to a simple rule of the form xt = ba at compared to
optimal discretionary policy.
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Comparing the two solutions in Equations (78) and (80) reveals that for 0 < ρa < 1,
commitment under a simple rule achieves lower inflation volatility following technology
shocks. This shows that discretionary monetary policy under financial frictions suffers
from a stabilization bias relative to policies that involve some sort of policy commitment
to future actions. Importantly, this stabilization bias is present in the financial accelerator
economy even if technology shocks are the only aggregate shocks. This is in contrast to
the standard case (ϑ = ν = 0), where divine coincidence holds such that the stabilization
bias non-existent (in the absence of ad-hoc mark-up shocks). The stabilization bias is
also not present if shocks do not generate persistent effects in the future, equivalent to
ρa = 0. In this case, private rational expectations of future shocks are zero and the central
bank finds it optimal to re-optimize every period anyway, just like under discretion. As
a result, there are no benefits from committing to the simple rule.
We have thus established that discretionary monetary policy suffers from a stabiliza-
tion bias relative to optimal commitment policies in the financial accelerator economy.
It is important to note that this is different from the inflationary bias, which describes
the su-boptimal performance of discretionary policy in the presence of financial frictions
relative to discretion in the standard model. While the causes of the inflationary bias
are largely beyond the control of central banks, the stabilization bias can be partially
mitigated by a simple rule commitment, which influences private sector expectations and
improves the trade-off between inflation and output gap stabilization.
Notably, the commitment to a simple rule can be operationalized under discretion.
As shown by Clarida et al. (1999), this requires society to appoint a central banker that
places a relative weight on output gap stabilization that is different from the welfare-based
weight.
Proposition 7 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). Optimal discretionary
monetary policy with relative weight λ˜ on output gap stabilization mimics optimal com-
mitment to a simple rule of the form xt = ba at if
λ˜ = (1− ρa˜˜β) κ˜˜˜κλ (81)
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 14 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). Under 0 < ρ < 1, it holds
that:
λ˜ < λ (82)
The required relative weight on output gap stabilization such that discretion mimics the
simple commitment is thus lower than the welfare-based weight. In turn, this implies that
the relative weight on inflation to improve the performance under discretion has to be
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higher. In the spirit of Rogoff (1985), we may interpret these results as requiring society to
appoint an inflation-conservative central banker to mitigate the stabilization bias under
discretion. In this context, inflation conservatism means having a strong(er) preference
for inflation stabilization, as governed by a higher weight on inflation stabilization. If
society appoints such an inflation-conservative central banker operating under discretion,
macroeconomic volatility is reduced and household welfare increases.
Assumption 5 The persistence of technology shocks ρa satisfies:
ρa
˜˜β < 1 (83)
Proposition 8 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). Under Assumption 2
and Assumption 5, it holds that
∂λ˜
∂ν
< 0 (84)
∂λ˜
∂ψ
< 0 (85)
such that the optimal degree of inflation conservatism increases in the degree of financial
frictions as captured by ν and ψ.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 8 shows that the stronger the financial frictions, the more conservative
the central banker must be. Prevailing financial frictions lead to a flattening of the
Phillips curve, and a larger degree of forward-looking behavior being relevant for cur-
rent macroeconomic outcomes. Accordingly, the stabilization bias of discretionary policy
(neglecting the forward-looking behavior) increases in the degree of financial frictions.
With an inflation-conservative central banker, the public knows that inflation will re-
spond less to a cost-push shock, such that future expected inflation rises less in the face
of a positive cost-push shock shock. As a consequence, current inflation can be stabilized,
with a smaller fall in the output gap, such that welfare increases. Figure 3 shows the
corresponding Rogoff inflation weight as a function of the degree of financial frictions16:
Lemma 15 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). Under Assumption 5, it
holds that
∂λ˜
∂ρ
< 0 (86)
such that the optimal degree of inflation conservatism increases in the degree of shock
persistence.
16The calibration used for this figure is described in more detail in Section 4.3 below.
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Figure 3: Rogoff Inflation Weight
and Financial Frictions
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Note: The required inflation weight λ˜−1 relative to the weight on output gap such that dis-
cretionary policy mimics the solution under commitment to a simple rule, as a function of the
degree of financial frictions.
The optimal Rogoff-weight decreases in the degree of shock persistence. The more
persistent the shocks, the lower is the optimal weight on output gap stabilization, as seen
in Figure 4, confirming the results by Clarida et al. (1999) for the financial accelerator
model at hand. As with the degree of financial frictions, a larger shock persistence
amplifies the stabilization bias of discretionary policy, such that a Rogoff-conservative
central banker is more advisable if shocks are more persistent.
Figure 4: Rogoff Inflation Weight
and Persistence
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Note: The required inflation weight λ˜−1 relative to the weight on output gap such that discre-
tionary policy mimics the solution under commitment to a simple rule, as a function of shock
persistence parameter. NK is the standard New Keynesian model (in black) and FF (in red)
is the financial accelerator economy.
Comparing the discretionary policy with simple commitment thus suggests that in-
flation conservatism can improve welfare in the face of financial frictions. This result
may come at a surprise given the previous finding that the financial accelerator induces
inefficient output gap fluctuations. At first glance, the resulting additional output gap
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volatility may hence call for a stronger focus on stabilizing economic activity. However,
as the approximated household welfare reveals, the welfare-based relative weight on infla-
tion stabilization remains high in the financial accelerator model. Moreover, stabilizing
inflation is more costly in terms of the output gap for discretionary policy because of
the flattening of the Phillips curve. Against this backdrop, the stabilization of infla-
tion emerges as the more important central bank mandate. Society can ensure that the
central bank minimizes the stabilization bias relative to optimal commitment policy by
appoint an inflation-conservative central banker. At the same this, this also reduces the
inflationary bias in the financial accelerator economy relative to the standard model.
While inflation-conservative discretion mimicks commitment to a simple rule is thus
favorable over discretion using the welfare-based weight, it is not the fully optimal policy.
The benchmark first-best policy is optimal commitment policy. The next section thus an-
alyzes optimal commitment policy and compares macroeconomic stabilization and welfare
implications under the different policy regimes.
4.3 Optimal Commitment Policy
The advisability of inflation conservatism in the presence of financial frictions stems from
the inherent stabilization bias of discretionary policy. While discretion constitutes a
natural benchmark as discussed by Clarida et al. (1999), it may be argued that central
banks increasingly (try to) rely on commitment policy.17 However, the commitment to
a simple rule considered in the previous section restricts the central bank’s action to
be a simple rule with respect to the shocks. This section derives the implementation
of monetary policy under commitment, serving as a the welfare-optimal benchmark to
evaluate the gains from discretionary policy under inflation conservatism.
To derive the optimal commitment policy, suppose that the central bank was able to
credibly commit to an entire path for current and future inflation and the output gap.
In that case, the central bank optimization problem is to maximize household welfare or
the expected current and future weighted volatilities of inflation and output gap. We can
write the optimization problem as:
min
{pit+s,xt+s}∞s=0
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
{
pi2t+s + λx
2
t+s
}
(87)
s.t. Et[pit+s] = Et[κ˜xt+s +
˜˜βpit+1+s +ϑκσ(1 + νµ)xt+1+s−ϑκ(νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)at+s] (88)
where Equation 88 combines both Euler equation and Phillips curve. Denoting the asso-
ciated Lagrange multiplier by Λt, the first-order conditions under the timeless perspective
17In particular, the prevailing use of forward guidance and projected paths for the nominal interest
rate among major central banks in the aftermath of the Great Recession and in the zero lower bound
period may be considered as being closer to commitment than to discretion.
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(Woodford, 2003a,b) imply:
pit + Λt −
˜˜β
β
Λt−1 = 0 (89)
λxt − κ˜Λt − K − κ˜
β
Λt−1 = 0 (90)
Rearranging and eliminating Lagrange multipliers Λt yields the targeting rule under com-
mitment.
Lemma 16 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). The optimal targeting rule
under commitment is given by:
pit + ϑυpit−1 = −λ
κ˜
(
xt −
˜˜β
β
xt−1
)
(91)
with
υ =
κσ(1 + νµ)
βκ˜
(92)
As a comparison, the (nested) equivalent targeting rule in the standard New Keynesian
model is:
pit = − λ
κ(σ + η)
(xt − xt−1) . (93)
As discussed above, financial frictions make private expectations of the future more im-
portant for current dynamics. As a response, the fully optimal commitment policy hence
follows a targeting rule with more inertia by additionally considering lagged inflation,
and responds stronger to the output gap. In contrast to the standard model, the optimal
targeting rule considers the deviation of current output to the scaled past output gap,
which results from explicitly taking the increasing degree of forward-looking behavior into
account.
Lemma 17 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). Under Assumption 2, it
holds that
∂υ
∂ν
> 0 (94)
∂υ
∂ψ
> 0 (95)
such that the degree to which optimal commitment policy responds to lagged inflation
increases in the degree of financial frictions as captured by ν and ψ.
This highlights again that, as forward-looking behavior becomes more important, a com-
mitment to more inertia becomes more pressing. Accordingly, the optimal commitment
policy is more persistent under financial frictions than in the standard model. This al-
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lows the central bank to better influence the public’s expectations, improving the trade-off
between output gap and inflation stabilization.
Unfortunately, the case of commitment does not allow for a convenient analytic so-
lution. Hence, I solve the model under commitment numerically to compare the fully
optimal policy with discretion and the case of Rogoff-conservatism. For this purpose, I
also augment the model by two additional shocks: A preference shock εct to household’s
marginal utility of consumption, and a financial shock εrt that shifts the required loan
rate.18 The corresponding linearized Euler equation can then be written as:
yt = −σ−1(rt − Et[pit+1 + Et[εct+1 − εct ]) + Et[yt+1] (96)
The spread is then given by
rLt = rt + ν(wt + ht − nt) + εrt (97)
The model parametrization follows conventional values in the literature. For the standard
New Keynesian parameters, I largely adopt the parameter values from Ravenna and
Walsh (2006). Accordingly, the quarterly household discount rate β is calibrated to
0.99, implying a steady state quarterly interest rate of 1%. For the inverse elasticity
of intertemporal substitution, I set σ = 1.5 and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
with respect to the real wage η = 2.19 The Calvo parameter of non-adjusting firms
in each period is calibrated to θ = 0.75, such that the average duration of prices is four
quarters and the slope of the Phillips curve with respect to marginal costs is approximately
κ = 0.086. The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods is set to  = 11,
implying a steady-state mark-up of 10%. The welfare-based weight on the output gap is
then given by λ = 0.027.
The cost channel requires ϑ = 1.20 For the elasticity of the loan rate to leverage, I
follow Bernanke et al. (1999) by setting ν = 0.05. As demonstrated in the Appendix,
this implies an elasticity of equity to the nominal interest rate of approx. µ = 1.05. The
elasticity of equity to output is calibrated at ψ = 6. As shown in Section 2.3, this implies
that the financial accelerator generates an amplification of technology shocks by 20%,
roughly in line with the original financial accelerator by Bernanke et al. (1999). The
calibration is then also in line with Assumptions 1, 2 and 4. With respect to monetary
policy, I assume that the central bank follows the simplest version of the Taylor rule with
18None of the results of the previous sections hinges on the assumption that the technology shock is the
only aggregate shock. The corresponding closed-form solutions in the extension with the two additional
shocks are shown in the Appendix.
19This is higher than in Ravenna and Walsh (2006), who set η = 1, but is more in line with empirical
estimates, see for example Smets and Wouters (2007) or Del Negro et al. (2015).
20As discussed in Ravenna and Walsh (2006), intermediate values 0 < ϑ < 1 imply that households pay
the remainder of the interest tax on wages. In the absence of financial frictions, the mapping between
marginal costs and the output gap is thus unaffected relative to the case where ϑ = 1. To disentangle
the effect of the cost channel and financial frictions, I just consider the polar cases of ϑ = 1 and ϑ = 0.
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Table 1: Calibration
Parameter Description Value
β Household discount factor 0.99
σ Inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1.5
η Frisch labor supply elasticity 2
θ Calvo pricing fraction non-adjusting firms 0.75
 Good elasticity of substitution 11
ϑ Cost channel 1
ν Sensitivity of loan rate to leverage 0.05
ψ Elasticity of equity to output 6
µ Elasticity of equity to interest rate 1.05
φpi Taylor rule response to inflation 1.50
100σa Std. dev. technology shock 0.585
100σc Std. dev. preference shock 1.470
100σr Std. dev. financial shock 0.845
coefficient φpi = 1.5. The autocorrelation coefficients of all shocks are set to 0.90, and the
shock variances are calibrated to match the empirically observed variances of quarterly
GDP-deflator inflation and quarterly output per capita growth for the U.S. 1964-2008.
Using this calibration, Figure 5 illustrates optimal monetary policy under commitment
from a timeless perspective following a technology shock.21 In the standard model, tech-
nology shocks only appear as demand shocks in the Euler equation. As under discretion,
optimal commitment perfectly offsets their effect on inflation and the output gap by ap-
propriately adjusting the nominal interest rate. Under financial frictions, the breakdown
of divine coincidence implies that also optimal commitment policy fails to completely
stabilize technology shocks and has to allow for some fluctuation in the output gap and
inflation. In particular, the central bank initially does not increase the nominal interest
rate to the same extent as it does in the standard model. Accordingly, this generates
some deflation and a positive output gap on impact. Afterwards, however, the path of
nominal interest rates is slightly more contractionary compared to the standard model,
such that the output gap follows a hump-shaped path and inflation stays positive for a
prolonged period of time. Overall, the central bank sacrifices some output gap volatility
in favor of a more favorable stabilization of inflation under commitment.
After having solved for the optimal policies under discretion using the welfare-based
mandate, under discretion with inflation conservatism and under commitment, we are
now able to compare the stabilization performance across policy regimes. In particular,
the aim is to evaluate the performance of the inflation-conservative central banker relative
21The graph shows optimal commitment policy based on the first order approximated equations of the
economy subject to the quadratic objective. As I assume that the steady state of the model is efficient
due to the presence of some appropriate subsidies, the second-order terms of the Ramsey planner’s FOCs
evaluate to zero (Woodford, 2002). This avoids spurious welfare rankings that can in principal arise if one
does not assume an efficient steady state and fails to compute the FOCs of the Ramsey planner’s problem
subject to the nonlinear equations characterizing the economy and then approximate these FOCs to first
order (Kim and Kim, 2003).
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Figure 5: Technology Shock under Commitment
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Note: Impulse response functions for a technology shock with an autoregressive coefficient of
0.9. The shock size is calibrated to yield a one-percent increase of output under the Taylor
rule in the NK model. All variables are in percentage deviations from the non-stochastic
steady state, except for inflation and interest rate which are in percentage-point deviations.
A period is a quarter, NK is the standard New Keynesian model (in black) and FF (in red) is
the financial accelerator economy.
to the optimal commitment policy. As a first step, consider Figure 6, which shows how a
technology shock is propagated under full commitment compared to inflation-conservative
discretion. For the purpose of comparison, the standard discretion solution and the simple
Taylor rule solution are plotted as well.
Focusing first on commitment relative to discretion and Taylor rule, one can see that
output responses are almost identical under the different regimes. This mirrors the low
prominence of output stabilization in the central bank mandate. Put differently, it is
evident from the figure that the main benefits from discretion and commitment stem
from the improved stabilization of inflation. The response of inflation is substantially
lower for all policy regimes relative to the Taylor rule, which is thus far from optimal in
this context.
Comparing the full commitment policy to discretion using the welfare-based weight
shows that the former is able to achieve both lower output gap and inflation variability.
As discussed above, the optimal commitment policy implies some inertia in adjusting the
nominal interest rate, such that inflation initially falls by a bit more and the output gap
increases by less than under inflation-conservative discretionary policy. This reflects the
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Figure 6: Technology Shock across Monetary Policy Regimes
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Note: Impulse response functions for a technology shock with an autoregressive coefficient of
0.9. The shock size is calibrated to yield a one-percent increase of output under the Taylor
rule in the model. All variables are in percentage deviations from the non-stochastic steady
state, except for inflation and interest rate which are in percentage-point deviations. A period
is a quarter, and all impulse responses are for the financial accelerator economy.
improved output gap to inflation trade-off that a policymaker faces if he is able to fully
commit to complete paths of the output gap and inflation.
In contrast to the other policy regimes, Rogoff-conservative central banker stabilizes
inflation almost completely, mirroring his large preference for stable inflation. As such,
inflation is even less volatile than under optimal commitment. This comes at the expense
of a larger volatility of the output gap, even higher than under the standard Taylor rule.
This highlights that the gains from appointing an inflation-conservative central banker
may be substantial in the face of financial frictions, but that inflation conservatism may
at the same time lead to slightly higher volatility of economic activity.
An alternative way to see this result is to consider policy frontiers following technology
shocks.22 These combinations of efficient inflation and output gap volatilities are shown in
Figure 7 below. While the achievable combinations of inflation and output gap volatility
under discretionary policy cannot be altered by the inflation-conservative central banker,
he chooses a different point on the policy frontier. As such, the solution under Rogoff-
conservatism comes closer to the policy frontier under commitment and thus reduces the
22The policy frontiers for preference shocks and financial shocks are very similar and shown in the
Appendix.
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stabilization bias.
Figure 7: Policy Frontiers
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Note: Efficient policy frontiers under discretion following a one-standard-deviation technology
shock in σ2pi, σ
2
x space. Points to the right of the frontiers are inefficient, points to the left
infeasible. The circles show the optimal solutions under discretion and commitment given
the welfare-based relative weight on the output gap λ. The diamond is the solution under
Rogoff-discretion with weight λ˜.
Note furthermore that the efficient solution in the standard NK model is zero inflation
and output gap volatility for both discretion and commitment. Therefore, the Rogoff-
conservative central banker also reduces the inflationary bias of discretion in the financial
accelerator economy relative to the economy without financial frictions.
Finally, we can measure welfare gains from inflation conservatism quantitatively, as
displayed in Table 2. It shows the standard deviations of inflation and output gap follow-
ing a one-standard-deviation technology shock in all policy regimes, for both the standard
NK model and the financial accelerator economy, and the associated inflationary bias and
the stabilization bias.23 Both are measured in terms of the implied inflation gap premium,
which follows Kuester and Wieland (2010) by translating welfare losses into corresponding
increases in the standard deviation of inflation.
In terms of overall stabilization of macroeconomic dynamics and associated welfare
losses, the table shows that Rogoff-discretionary policy comes close to mirroring the full
commitment solution. Under inflation-conservatism, the inflation gap premia are very
small, substantially lower than under conventional discretion and the Taylor rule. The
conservative central banker thus substantially reduces both the inflation bias and the
stabilization bias.
23The corresponding tables for preference shocks and financial shocks feature the same results and are
shown in the Appendix.
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Table 2: Policy Performance Under Different Regimes
Policy
Financial Accelerator Standard NK Infl.
sd(pi) sd(x) Stab. Bias sd(pi) sd(x) Stab. Bias Bias
Commitment 0.0055 0.1316 0 0 0 0 0.0224
Rogoff-Discretion 0.0004 0.1436 0.0078 0 0 0 0.0237
Discretion 0.0243 0.1412 0.0252 0 0 0 0.0337
Taylor Rule 0.3157 0.1125 0.3155 0.2637 0.0957 0.264 0.1739
Note: Standard deviations of inflation and output gap in response to one-standard-deviation tech-
nology shocks for alternative monetary policy regimes. The stabilization bias is measured as inflation
gap premium (IGP), i.e. the increase in the standard deviation of inflation that is equivalent to the
loss relative to full commitment policy. The inflation bias is measured as the IGP in the financial
accelerator economy relative to the standard NK model.
5 Conclusion
The link between inflation and economic activity as prescribed by the Phillips curve is
at the core of most modern thinking about monetary policy. Yet, the applicability of the
Phillips curve has been called into question after the Global Financial Crisis, given the
missing disinflation in the face of collapsing output. Against this background, this paper
analyzes the implications of financial frictions for the Phillips curve.
I first propose a small-scale New Keynesian DSGE model with a financial accelerator.
The tractability of the framework allows me to show analytically that the presence of
financial frictions (a) reduces the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve with respect
to the output gap as the counter-cyclical credit spread dampens the pro-cyclicality of
marginal costs, (b) amplifies shocks via endogenous cost-push shock effects and (c) ren-
ders forward-looking behavior more important for inflation dynamics. These are charac-
teristics that are present in many structural New Keynesian DSGE models with financial
frictions.
A second-order approximation of household welfare shows that fluctuations in the
credit spread generate inefficient fluctuations in marginal costs, in turn creating an addi-
tional inefficiency wedge in the economy. I show analytically that a central bank operating
under discretion incurs a substantial deterioration of policy performance if financial fric-
tions prevail in the economy. The endogenous mark-up effects induced by the financial
accelerator lead to a breakdown of divine coincidence. The resulting inflationary bias
relative to the standard economy is aggravated by a flattening of the Phillips curve and
the higher relevance of forward-looking behavior for current inflation dynamics. The
inflationary bias is increasing in the degree of financial frictions.
I prove that welfare under discretionary policy can be improved by appointing a
conservative central banker in the spirit of Rogoff (1985). If the central banker is more
inflation-conservative than society, i.e. if he places a larger relative weight on inflation
stabilization, he is able to improve upon the trade-off between output gap and inflation. I
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show that the welfare-maximizing degree of inflation conservatism increases in the degree
to which financial frictions are present.
Based on these findings, the interplay between financial frictions, the Phillips curve
and the optimal response by central banks emerge as a potential explanation for the
missing disinflation puzzle. The results suggest that monetary policy should be geared
towards inflation stabilization in the presence of financial frictions. This notion is com-
plementary to other explanations put forward in the literature, such as the anchoring of
inflation expectations.
From a broader perspective, the findings of this paper reiterate a key result of the
New Keynesian DSGE literature: Welfare costs of business cycles are mainly incurred via
inflation volatility, which generates dispersion of intermediate goods prices under Calvo
pricing and thus a suboptimal allocation of consumption. These high welfare costs of
inflation volatility are hard-wired into the New Keynesian DSGE framework, and tend to
dominate other sources of welfare costs. This includes considerations of financial frictions
and the stabilization of leverage cycles. A prescription for future research is hence to
investigate the circumstances under which the presence of financial frictions generates
financial cycle stabilization motives with a larger role relative to inflation and output
gap stabilization for household welfare. One possible avenue is to focus on (non-linear)
models featuring systemic risk.
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Appendix
A Details on the Financial Friction
This section provides a more detailed description of the loan contract and of equity financ-
ing. These constitute the two funding opportunities that are available to entrepreneurs,
who operate the intermediate goods-producing firms. As in Christiano et al. (2005),
Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and De Fiore et al. (2011), wages have to be paid in advance
of production. Entrepreneurs can obtain the required funds to pay wages either by eq-
uity financing on stock markets or by borrowing from a financial intermediary. As in
Bernanke et al. (1999) and De Fiore et al. (2011), I assume the existence of a costly-state
verification problem between firm’s and banks. This gives rise to entrepreneur leverage
being relevant for marginal costs, in turn leading to the canonical financial accelerator
mechanism.
Let’s first consider the financial contract, and drop all indices indexing firms for
the sake of plain notation. Suppose that the entrepreneurs operating the intermediate
goods-producing have available equity financing of Nt, which is described in more detail
below. In order to hire Ht workers and pay them the market-determined wage wt before
production, entrepreneurs need to borrow
Lt = WtHt −Nt (A1)
from a financial intermediary. Intermediate goods are produced according to a production
function that is linear in labor. In addition to aggregate technology, assume that there
are additional firm-specific idiosyncratic productivity shocks ω. Production is thus given
by
Yt = ωtAtHt
The idiosyncratic productivity shocks are assumed to be private information of the firm,
while aggregate technology is commonly observed. The bank can only observe the id-
iosyncratic output of firms after production by paying monitoring costs proportional to
output. This costly state verification problem gives rise to a contract specifying a loan
amount Lt, a loan rate R
L
t and a threshold value for the idiosyncratic shock ω¯t defined
by:
ω¯tAtHt = R
L
t Lt (A2)
If the realization of ωt ≥ ω¯t, the firm repays RLt Lt and the bank does not monitor the firm.
If ωt < ω¯t, the firm defaults, the bank decides to monitor the firm, pays the monitoring
cost and seizes the remaining fraction of output (1− ζ)ωtAtHt.
The optimal contract maximizes the entrepreneur’s expected return (A3), i.e. the
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share of output accruing to the entrepreneur, subject to the borrowing constraint (A4),
the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility constraint (A5), the participation constraint of
the financial intermediary (A6) and the repayment threshold (A7). Equations (A8) - (A9)
define the shares of output accruing to the entrepreneur and the financial intermediary,
respectively. Total output is split between entrepreneur, the financial intermediary and
monitoring costs, as defined in (A10).
The contract can then be written as:
max
Lt,RLt ,ω¯t,Ht
f(ω¯t)AtHt (A3)
s.t. WtHt ≤ Lt +Nt (A4)
f(ω¯t)AtHt ≥ RtNt (A5)
g(ω¯t, ζ)AtHt ≥ RtLt (A6)
ω¯tAtHt = R
L
t Lt (A7)
f(ω¯t) =
∫ ∞
ω¯
(ωt − ω¯t)Φdω (A8)
g(ω¯t, ζ) =
∫ ∞
0
(1− ζ)ωtΦdωt +
∫ ∞
ω¯t
ω¯tΦdωt (A9)
f(ω¯t) + g(ω¯t, ζ) + ζ
∫ ω¯t
0
ωtΦdω = 1 (A10)
De Fiore et al. (2011) provide conditions under which the borrowing constraint (A4)
holds with equality, and show that the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility constraint (A5)
is slack given the optimal contract, while the financial intermediary participation con-
straint (A6) is binding. Defining
vt =
At
Wt
(A11)
as auxiliary variables capturing terms that are exogenous to the contract, we can thus
rewrite the maximization problem as
max
Lt,RLt ,ω¯t
f(ω¯t)vt(Lt +Nt) (A12)
s.t. g(ω¯t, ζ)vt(Lt +Nt) = RtLt (A13)
where the threshold and the shares are given by Equations (A7)- (A10). Denoting the
Lagrange multiplier on (A13) by ξt, the FOCs with respect to Lt and ω¯t are given by:
f(ω¯t)vt − ξt(g(ω¯t, ζ)vt −Rt) = 0 (A14)
f ′(ω¯t)(Lt +Nt)− ξt(g′(ω¯t, ζ)vt(Lt +Nt)) = 0 (A15)
where f ′(.) and g′(.) denote the derivatives of f and g with respect to ω¯t. Combining
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these equations yields:
f(ω¯t)vt
g(ω¯t, ζ)vt −Rt =
f ′(ω¯t)
g′(ω¯t, ζ)
(A16)
Equation (A16), together with (A13) and (A7), defines the optimal contract {Lt, RLt , ω¯t}.
We can rearrange these equations to:
RLt =
ω¯t
f(ω¯t)
f ′(ω¯t)
g′(ω¯t, ζ)
Nt
wtHt −NtRt (A17)
This equation can be rewritten as
RLt
Rt
= s
(
Nt
WtHt
)
(A18)
with s′(.) < 0. As in Bernanke et al. (1999), we can approximate this relationship linearly
around the steady state by
rLt = rt + ν(wt + ht − nt) + εrt (A19)
with 0 < ν < 1 and where an ad-hoc financial shock to the loan-rate is added. Hence, the
costly state verification problem between entrepreneurs and banks implies a mapping of
structural parameters into the elasticity of the credit spread with respect to entrepreneur
leverage. This is Equation (24) shown in the main part. Intuitively speaking, higher
entrepreneur leverage increases the probability of firm default, such that the financial
intermediary requires a higher loan rate as a compensation for taking the higher risk.
With respect to equity, Equation (12) postulates that it depends positively on output
and negatively on the nominal interest rate. Similar to Boehl (2017), I assume that
entrepreneurs can issue equity in the stock market. Imposing no arbitrage, equity needs
to satisfy
St = Nt
Et[R
S
t+1]
Rt
(A20)
where St is the stock price St and R
S
t+1 denotes the return on equity. In equilibrium, with
(risk-neutral) entrepreneurs being indifferent between increasing or decreasing the loan
volume, it must furthermore hold that
Et[R
S
t+1] = R
L
t (A21)
Stocks are priced by risk-neutral financial traders associated with the financial interme-
diary according to the expected dividend on the stocks. I assume that entrepreneurs’s
consumption is fully taxed. As a result, they pay out the whole return left after repaying
the loan as dividend at the end of each period. From the financial contract, this return
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is given by f(ω¯t)Yt. Accordingly, financial traders attach a price of
St =
f(ω¯t)Yt
Rt
(A22)
to stocks. Combining Equations (A20)-(A22) and using (A18) yields
Nt =
f(ω¯t)Yt
Rt
s−1
(
Nt
WtHt
)
(A23)
where s−1(.) is the inverse function of s(.). This is what Equation (12) in the main text
captures, noting that wages and labor supply can be written as a function of output
using household’s intratemporal optimality condition and the production function. Log-
linearizing this equation yields
nt = ψyt − µrt (A24)
with ψ > 0, µ = 1
1−ν > 0 which means that entrepreneurs can raise more equity if
(expected) output is higher, but less equity if the nominal interest rate is higher (due
to higher opportunity costs for financial traders). The financial accelerator hence entails
the well-known result by Bernanke et al. (1999) that equity is pro-cyclical, while at the
same time depending directly on central bank interest rates.
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B Linearized Equations Characterizing Equilibrium
Sticky-Price Economy
Euler equation:
yt = −σ−1(rt − Et[pit+1) + Et[yt+1] (A25)
Intratemporal consumption-labor trade-off:
wt = ηht + σyt (A26)
Production function:
yt = at + ht (A27)
Marginal costs:
mct = wt + ϑr
L
t − at (A28)
Phillips curve:
pit = κmct + βEt[pit+1] (A29)
Credit spread:
rLt = rt + ν(wt + ht − nt) (A30)
Equity:
nt = ψyt − µrt (A31)
Taylor rule:
rt = φpipit + η
m
t (A32)
Flexible-Price Economy
Euler equation:
yft = −σ−1
(
rft
)
+ Et[y
f
t+1] (A33)
Intratemporal consumption-labor trade-off:
wft = ηh
f
t + σy
f
t (A34)
Production function:
yft = at + h
f
t (A35)
Marginal costs:
0 = wft + ϑr
L,f
t − at (A36)
Credit spread:
rL,ft = r
f
t + ν(w
f
t + h
f
t − nft ) (A37)
Equity:
nft = ψy
f
t − µrft (A38)
Auxiliary Variables and Shocks
Efficient output:
yet =
1 + η
σ + η
at (A39)
Output gap:
xt = yt − yet (A40)
Technology shock:
at = ρa at−1 + ηat (A41)
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C Determinacy Regions
Figure A1: Determinacy Region NK Model
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Note: The determinacy (yellow) and indeterminacy (blue) regions of the standard New Key-
nesian model (ϑ = 0) for a standard Taylor rule responding to inflation and output gap. The
x-axis shows the output gap coefficient and the y-axis the coefficient on inflation.
Figure A2: Determinacy Region Financial Accelerator Model
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Note: The determinacy (yellow) and indeterminacy (blue) regions of the financial frictions
model (ϑ = 1, ν = 0.05, ψ = 6, µ = 11−ν ) for a standard Taylor rule responding to inflation
and output gap. The x-axis shows the output gap coefficient and the y-axis the coefficient on
inflation.
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D Welfare Approximation
This section shows the proof for Proposition 1. Start from the per-period household
utility function, which is given by
Ut = U(Ct, Ht) =
C1−σt
1− σ − χ
H1+ηt
1 + η
(A42)
and is thus separable in consumption and hours worked. A second-order Taylor expansion
of Ut around a steady state (C,H) yields
Ut−U ' UcC
(
Ct − C
C
)
+UhH
(
Ht −H
H
)
+
1
2
UccC
2
(
Ct − C
C
)2
+
1
2
UhhH
2
(
Ht −H
H
)2
+tip
(A43)
where variables without a time subscript denote steady state values, Ux denotes the
derivative with respect to x and tip stands for terms independent of policy. Rewriting
this equation in log deviations by replacing Xt−X
X
≈ xt + 12x2t where xt = log
(
Xt
X
)
gives
Ut − U ' UcC
(
ct +
(
1
2
+
UccC
2Uc
)
c2t
)
+ UhH
(
ht +
(
1
2
+
UhhH
2Uh
)
h2t
)
+ tip (A44)
Noting that UccC
Uc
= −σ and UhhH
Uh
= η, as well as making use of the ressource constraint
ct = yt we can rewrite this as
Ut − U ' UcC
(
yt +
1− σ
2
y2t
)
+ UhH
(
ht +
1 + η
2
h2t
)
+ tip (A45)
From the production function, we have that
ht = yt − at + dt (A46)
where dt = log
∫ 1
0
(
Pj,t
Pt
dj
)−
is capturing price dispersion. It can be shown that
dt =

2
varj{pj,t} (A47)
or in other words price dispersion is proportional to the cross-sectional variance of relative
prices in a neighborhood of a symmetric steady state up to a second-order approximation.
We can use this to rewrite utility as
Ut−U = UcC
(
yt +
1− σ
2
y2t
)
+UhH
(
yt +

2
varj{pj,t}+ 1 + η
2
(yt − at)2
)
+tip (A48)
Dividing by UcC and rearranging terms yields
Ut − U
UcC
=
(
1 +
UhH
UcC
)
yt +
1− σ
2
ŷ2t +
1
2
[
UhH
UcC
(
 varj{pj,t}+ (1 + η) (yt − at)2
)]
+ tip
(A49)
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The steady-state of the flexible-price equilibrium is given by
Y f =
(
1
χτ 
−1ϑR
L
) 1
σ+η
(A50)
which shows that it is distorted by the presence of monopolistic competition via the
mark-up 
−1 > 1 and the financial friction via the non-negative credit spread that implies
RL ≥ R = β−1 > 1. As described in the main text, I assume that there are some steady-
state subsidies τ on firm’s marginal costs such that τ 
−1R
L = 1 and the steady-state is
efficient. Imposing efficiency of the steady state through appropriate subsidies, we have
− Uh
Uc
= MPN =
Y
H
(A51)
such that
UhH
UcC
= −1 (A52)
and the linear term involving yt drops out. We are left with
Ut − U
UcC
= −1
2
[
(σ − 1)y2t +  varj{pj,t}+ (1 + η) (yt − at)2
]
+ tip (A53)
The efficient allocation is given by
yet =
1 + η
σ + η
at (A54)
which we can use to replace at and get
Ut − U
UcC
= −1
2
[
(σ − 1)y2t +  varj{pj,t}+ (1 + η)
(
yt − σ + η
1 + η
yet
)2]
+ tip (A55)
which can be rearranged to
Ut − U
UcC
= −1
2
[
(σ + η)(yt − yet )2 +  varj{pj,t}
]
+ tip (A56)
Defining the output gap with respect to efficient output as xt = yt − yet , we can write
the second-order approximation of household welfare losses as a fraction of steady state
consumption (ignoring additive terms independent of policy) as
Wt = Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
(
Ut+s − U
UcC
)
(A57)
= −1
2
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
(
 varj{pj,t+s}+ (σ + η)x2t+s
)
(A58)
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Following Woodford (2003a), we can rewrite
∞∑
s=0
βsvarj{pj,t+s} = θ
(1− βθ)(1− θ)
∞∑
s=0
βspi2t+s (A59)
Using κ = (1−βθ)(1−θ)
θ
, we can write
Wt = −1
2
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
( 
κ
pi2t+s + (σ + η)x
2
t+s
)
(A60)
Finally, we can postulate a per-period loss function for policymakers with a normalized
unit weight on inflation:
Lt = pi2t + λx2t (A61)
where λ = κ(σ+η)

. This is what Proposition 1 in the main text states. At first glance, this
seems identical to the solution obtained in the standard model without a cost channel
and financial frictions. However, note that the wedge between flexible-price output and
the efficient level of output is given by
yft = y
e
t − ϑrLt (A62)
such that we can write the loss function as
Lt = pi2t + λ
(
yt − yft − ϑrLt
)2
(A63)
or alternatively using
rLt = r
f
t + ν(w
f
t + h
f
t − nft ) (A64)
as
Lt = pi2t + λ
(
xft −
ϑ
σ + η
rft −
ϑν
σ + η
levft
)2
(A65)
where all variables with superscript f refer to the flexible-price economy, xft = yt − yft
is the output gap with respect to the flexible-price economy with financial frictions and
levft = w
f
t + h
f
t − nft . Ignoring covariance terms, the loss function is approximately equal
to
Lt ≈ pi2t + λ
(
xft
)2
+
λϑ2
(σ + η)2
(
rft
)2
+
λϑ2ν2
(σ + η)2
(
levft
)2
(A66)
We may interpret the first two terms as representing the traditional central bank
mandate of stabilizing inflation and economic activity. The latter two terms are mandates
for stabilizing the volatility of interest rate and leverage, as these are crucial for loan terms
and hence marginal costs. These represent the additional wedge that emerges between
flexible-price economy and efficient economy due to the presence of financial frictions.
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E Proofs
This section shows the proofs of Propositions 2-8.
Proposition 2 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). The optimal targeting
rule for monetary policy under discretion is given by
pit = −λ
κ˜
xt (A67)
where
κ˜ = κ[σ + η − ϑσ + ϑν(1 + σ + η − ψ − µσ)] (A68)
Proof. Let us combine the Euler equation and the Phillips curve to one constraint given
by:
pit = κ˜ xt +
˜˜β Et[pit+1] + ϑκσ(1 + νµ)Et[xt+1]− ϑκ(νφ+ ϕσ(1 + νµ)) at (A69)
Let us denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with this constraint as Ξt. The first-
order conditions for inflation and output gap under discretion are given by:
pit = Ξt (A70)
− λxt − κ˜Ξt = 0 (A71)
Combining the first-order conditions yields:
pit = −λ
κ˜
xt (A72)
Proposition 3 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). The dynamics of
inflation, output gap and nominal interest rate under optimal discretionary policy are
given by
pit = −λϑκ νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)
κ˜2 + λ(1− ρaβ˜)
at (A73)
xt = −ϑκκ˜ νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)
κ˜2 + λ(1− ρaβ˜)
at (A74)
rt = −ϑκγ νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)
κ˜2 + λ(1− ρaβ˜)
at − σϕ at (A75)
where
β˜ = β + ϑκ(1 + νµ)
(
1− κ˜σ
λ
)
(A76)
γ = λρa + (1− ρa)σκ˜ (A77)
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Proof. Given the targeting rule under optimal discretion, the economy can be charac-
terized by two equations:
pit = κ˜ xt +
˜˜β Et[pit+1] + ϑκσ(1 + νµ)Et[xt+1]− ϑκ(νφ+ ϕσ(1 + νµ)) at (A78)
pit = −λ
κ˜
xt (A79)
Inserting the targeting rule in Equation (A78) and rearranging yields
pit =
λ
λ+ κ˜
β˜ Et[pit+1]− λ
λ+ κ˜
ϑκ(νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ))at (A80)
Iterating forward yields the solution for inflation. The solution for the output gap then
follows directly from the targeting rule. The dynamics of the nominal interest rate can
be obtained by inserting the solutions for inflation and output gap in the Euler equation.
Proposition 4 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). Assume further ρa = 0
and let Assumption 2 hold. Then it holds that
∂α
∂ν
> 0 (A81)
∂α
∂ψ
> 0 (A82)
such that the inflationary bias increases in the degree of financial frictions as captured by
ν and ψ via the flatter Phillips curve.
Proof. Under ρa = 0, we have that:
α ≡ νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)
κ˜2 + λ
(A83)
The derivative of α with respect to ν is given by:
∂α
∂ν
=
(φ+ ϕσµ)(κ˜2 + λ)− (νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ))∂κ˜2
∂ν
[κ˜+ λ(1− β˜)]2
(A84)
The denominator is positive, so the sign of the derivative is determined by the numerator.
The first term is strictly positive. The derivative in the second term is negative under
Assumption 2. We hence have that:
∂α
∂ν
> 0 (A85)
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For the second part, the derivative of α with respect to ψ is given by:
∂α
∂ψ
=
ν(κ˜2 + λ) ∂φ
∂ψ
− (νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ))∂κ˜2
∂ψ
[κ˜+ λ(1− β˜)]2
(A86)
Again, the sign is determined by the numerator. The first derivative in the numerator is
positive in any case. The second derivative is also negative in the financial accelerator
economy. We thus have that:
∂α
∂ψ
> 0 (A87)
Proposition 5 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). It holds that
∂β˜
∂ψ
> 0 (A88)
Under Assumption 4, it furthermore holds that
∂β˜
∂ν
> 0 (A89)
such that the inflationary bias increases in the degree of financial frictions as captured
by ν and ψ via the higher relevance of future expectations for current inflation dynamics.
Furthermore, monetary policy reacts more aggressive to technology shocks.
Proof. Note that β˜ is given by:
β˜ = β + ϑκ(1 + νµ)
(
1− κ˜σ
λ
)
(A90)
We thus have that:
∂β˜
∂ψ
= −ϑκ(1 + νµ)σ
λ
∂κ˜
∂ψ
= ϑ2νκ(1 + νµ)
σ
λ
> 0 (A91)
For the second part, we have that:
∂β˜
∂ν
= ϑκµ− ϑκσ
λ
[
µκ˜+ (1 + νµ)
∂κ˜
∂ν
]
(A92)
Rearranging and plugging in the derivative of κ˜ shows that the sign of the derivative is
determined by:
µ(λ− σκ˜)− σ(1 + νµ)(1 + σ + η − ψ − µσ) (A93)
This term is positive under Assumption 4.
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Proposition 6 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). The dynamics of
inflation and the output gap and nominal interest rate under optimal commitment to a
simple rule of the form xt = ba at are given by:
pit = −λϑκ(1− ρa˜˜β)νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)˜˜κ2 + λ(1− ρa˜˜β)2 at (A94)
xt = ϑκ˜˜κνφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)˜˜κ2 + λ(1− ρa˜˜β)2 at (A95)
Proof. As seen in Lemma 12, the optimal policy function is given by:
ba = ϑκ˜˜κνφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)˜˜κ2 + λ(1− ρa˜˜β)2 (A96)
The dynamics of inflation are in Lemma 11 for general ba as:
pit =
˜˜κ
1− ρa˜˜β ba at − ϑκ
νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)
1− ρa˜˜β at (A97)
Combining these two equations yields:
pit = ϑκ˜˜κ ˜˜κ
1− ρa˜˜β
νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)˜˜κ2 + λ(1− ρa˜˜β)2 at − ϑκ
νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)
1− ρa˜˜β at (A98)
This can be rearranged to yield the representation shown in the main text.
Proposition 7 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). Optimal discretionary
monetary policy with relative weight λ˜ on output gap stabilization mimics optimal com-
mitment to a simple rule of the form xt = ba at if
λ˜ = (1− ρa˜˜β) κ˜˜˜κλ (A99)
Proof. Discretion with a Rogoff-conservative weight yields the following inflation dy-
namics:
piRogofft = −λ˜ϑκ
νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)
κ˜2 + λ(1− ρaβ˜(λ˜))
at (A100)
Under commitment to a simple rule (CSR), inflation is given by:
piCSRt = −λϑκ(1− ρa˜˜β)νφ+ σϕ(1 + νµ)˜˜κ2 + λ(1− ρa˜˜β)2 at (A101)
Setting these two equations equal shows that inflation dynamics are identical if
λ˜
κ˜2 + λ(1− ρaβ˜(λ˜))
=
λ(1− ρa˜˜β)˜˜κ2 + λ(1− ρa˜˜β)2 (A102)
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The solution for λ˜ follows after some algebraic manipulations, noticing that β˜ is a func-
tion of λ˜.
Proposition 8 Let ϑ = 1, ν > 0 (financial accelerator economy). Under Assumption 2
and Assumption 5, it holds that
∂λ˜
∂ν
< 0 (A103)
∂λ˜
∂ψ
< 0 (A104)
such that the optimal degree of inflation conservatism increases in the degree of financial
frictions as captured by ν and ψ.
Proof. The first derivative is given by:
∂λ˜
∂ν
= −ρa κ˜˜˜κ ∂
˜˜β
∂ν
+ (1− ρa˜˜β)∂ κ˜˜˜κ
∂ν
(A105)
= −ρa κ˜˜˜κϑκν + (1− ρa˜˜β)ϑ ˜˜κ− κ˜κ˜2 ∂κ˜∂ν (A106)
We have that ˜˜κ > κ˜ for 0 < ρ < 1. Under Assumption 5, we have that (1− ρa˜˜β) > 0 and
∂κ˜
∂ν
< 0 under Assumption 2. This implies that:
∂λ˜
∂ν
< 0 (A107)
For the second part of the proposition, note that the derivative is given by:
∂λ˜
∂ν
= (1− ρa˜˜β)∂ κ˜˜˜κ
∂ψ
(A108)
= (1− ρa˜˜β) ˜˜κ− κ˜
κ˜2
∂κ˜
∂ψ
(A109)
We have that ˜˜κ > κ˜ for 0 < ρ < 1. Under Assumption 5, we have that (1− ρa˜˜β) > 0 and
∂κ˜
∂ψ
= −ϑν < 0 in the financial accelerator economy. This implies that:
∂λ˜
∂ψ
< 0 (A110)
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F Model Extension
F.1 Model Equations
This section shows the model extension with two additional aggregate shocks: A pref-
erence shock εct to household’s marginal utility of consumption, and a financial shock ε
r
t
that shifts the required loan rate. The utility function of households is given by:
Ut = Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
{
eε
c
t+s
C1−σt+s
1− σ − χ
H1+ηt+s
1 + η
}
The resulting optimality conditions are:
eε
c
tC−σt = βEt
[
Rt
pit+1
eε
c
t+1C−σt+1
]
(A111)
χHηt
eε
c
tC−σt
= Wt (A112)
The corresponding linearized equations describing household behavior can then be written
as:
yt = −σ−1
(
rt − Et[pit+1] + Et[εct+1]− εct
)
+ Et[yt+1] (A113)
wt = ηht + σyt − εct (A114)
The linearized equation for the credit spread is then given by:
rLt = rt + ν(wt + ht − nt) + εrt (A115)
Note that preference shocks lead to efficient output fluctuations:
yet =
1 + η
σ + η
at +
1
σ + η
εct (A116)
The model can be written compactly as
xt = −σ−1 (rt − Et[pit+1]) + Et[xt+1] + ut (A117)
pit = Kxt + ϑκ(1 + νµ)rt + βEt[pit+1] + et (A118)
where ut is a composite demand shock given by:
ut =
η(1− ρc)
σ(σ + η)
εct −
(1 + η)(1− ρa)
σ + η
at (A119)
and et is a composite cost-push shock:
et = κϑε
r
t + κνϑ
(
1− ψ
σ + η
εct − (ψ − 1)
1 + η
σ + η
at
)
(A120)
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The structure of the economy is hence similar to the one in the baseline model. The two
extra shocks alter efficient output and unfold additional demand shocks and cost-push
effects. Notably, the financial shock is inefficient and appears as a pure mark-up shock
in the Phillips curve only.
F.2 Optimal Discretionary Monetary Policy
The analytic solutions are presented in terms of the composite shocks for the sake of
illustrative exposition. Following the same steps as in the main analysis, the solution
under optimal discretionary policy is given by
pit =
λ
κ˜2 + λ(1− ρeβ˜)
et + λϑκ
σ(1 + νµ)
κ˜2 + λ(1− ρuβ˜)
ut (A121)
xt = − κ˜
κ˜2 + λ(1− ρeβ˜)
et − ϑκκ˜ σ(1 + νµ)
κ˜2 + λ(1− ρuβ˜)
ut (A122)
rt =
γe
κ˜2 + λ(1− ρeβ˜)
et +
γu(1 + ϑκ(1 + νµ))
κ˜2 + λ(1− ρuβ˜)
ut (A123)
where
γi = λρi + (1− ρi)σκ˜ for i = u, e (A124)
and all remaining parameters are defined as in the main text.
In line with the main analysis, this shows that optimal discretionary policy can be
perfectly stabilize preference shocks and financial shocks in the absence of financial fric-
tions (ϑ = 0, such that the second terms disappear, and et = 0). This is equivalent to
saying that divine coincidence continues to hold in this model extension without financial
frictions. If, however, financial frictions are present, preference and financial shocks gen-
erate endogenous cost-push effects. The mechanism is the same as the one for technology
shocks discussed in the main text. This leads to a breakdown of divine coincidence, and
an inflationary bias of discretionary monetary policy relative to the standard NK model.
F.3 Mimicking Commitment to Simple Rule
Let the simple rule be of the form:
xt = beet + buut (A125)
Inserting this in the Phillips curve yields
pit =
1 + ˜˜κbe
1− ρe˜˜β et +
(K − κ˜) + ˜˜κbu
1− ρu˜˜β ut (A126)
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where all parameters are defined as in the main text. The optimal values of be and bu are
the solution to the central bank’s optimization problem given by
min
be,bu
1
2
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs

( 1 + ˜˜κbe
1− ρe˜˜β
)2
+ λb2e
 e2t+s +
((K − κ˜) + ˜˜κbu
1− ρu˜˜β
)2
+ λb2u
u2t+s
(A127)
From the first order condition, it follows that the optimal policy functions with respect
to demand and cost-push shocks are given by:
be = −
˜˜κ˜˜κ2 + λ(1− ρe˜˜β)2 (A128)
bu = − (K − κ˜)
˜˜κ˜˜κ2 + λ(1− ρu˜˜β)2 (A129)
Using this result in the Phillips curve yields the solution for inflation:
pit =
λ(1− ρe˜˜β)˜˜κ2 + λ(1− ρe˜˜β)2 et + λϑκ
σ(1 + νµ)(1− ρu˜˜β)˜˜κ2 + λ(1− ρu˜˜β)2 ut (A130)
Given the previous result that preference shocks and financial shocks unfold similar
demand and cost-push effects as technology shocks, the results obtained for the baseline
model hold as well.
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F.4 Policy Regime Comparison
Figure A3: Preference Shock across Monetary Policy Regimes
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Note: Impulse response functions for a technology shock with an autoregressive coefficient of
0.9. The shock size is calibrated to yield a one-percent increase of output under the Taylor
rule in the model. All variables are in percentage deviations from the non-stochastic steady
state, except for inflation and interest rate which are in percentage-point deviations. A period
is a quarter, and all impulse responses are for the financial accelerator economy.
Table A1: Policy Performance Preference Shock
Policy
Financial Accelerator Standard NK Infl.
sd(pi) sd(x) Stab. Bias sd(pi) sd(x) Stab. Bias Bias
Commitment 0.0004 0.0107 0 0 0 0 0.0018
Rogoff-Discretion 0.0000 0.0116 0.0006 0 0 0 0.0019
Discretion 0.0020 0.0114 0.0020 0 0 0 0.0027
Taylor Rule 0.3106 0.0423 0.3107 0.2945 0.1068 0.2950 0.0975
Note: Standard deviations of inflation and output gap in response to one-standard-deviation prefer-
ence shocks for alternative monetary policy regimes. The stabilization bias is measured as inflation
gap premium (IGP), i.e. the increase in the standard deviation of inflation that is equivalent to the
loss relative to full commitment policy. The inflation bias is measured as the IGP in the financial
accelerator economy relative to the standard NK model.
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Figure A4: Financial Shock across Monetary Policy Regimes
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Note: Impulse response functions for a contractionary financial shock with an autoregressive
coefficient of 0.9. The shock size is calibrated to yield a one-percent decrease of output under
the Taylor rule in the FF model. All variables are in percentage deviations from the non-
stochastic steady state, except for inflation and interest rate which are in percentage-point
deviations. A period is a quarter, and all impulse responses are for the financial accelerator
economy.
Table A2: Policy Performance Financial Shock
Policy
Financial Accelerator Standard NK Infl.
sd(pi) sd(x) Stab. Bias sd(pi) sd(x) Stab. Bias Bias
Commitment 0.0425 1.0158 0 0 0 0 0.1732
Rogoff-Discretion 0.0030 1.1087 0.0599 0 0 0 0.1832
Discretion 0.1879 1.0904 0.1944 0 0 0 0.2604
Taylor Rule 4.9604 0.7318 4.9588 4.4434 1.6122 4.4513 2.1921
Note: Standard deviations of inflation and output gap in response to one-standard-deviation finan-
cial shocks for alternative monetary policy regimes. The stabilization bias is measured as inflation
gap premium (IGP), i.e. the increase in the standard deviation of inflation that is equivalent to the
loss relative to full commitment policy. The inflation bias is measured as the IGP in the financial
accelerator economy relative to the standard NK model.
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Figure A5: Policy Frontiers Preference Shock
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Note: Efficient policy frontiers under discretion following a one-standard-deviation preference
shock in σ2pi, σ
2
x space. Points to the right of the frontiers are inefficient, points to the left
infeasible. The circles show the optimal solutions under discretion and commitment given
the welfare-based relative weight on the output gap λ. The diamond is the solution under
Rogoff-discretion with weight λ˜.
Figure A6: Policy Frontiers Financial Shock
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Note: Efficient policy frontiers under discretion following a one-standard-deviation financial
shock in σ2pi, σ
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x space. Points to the right of the frontiers are inefficient, points to the left
infeasible. The circles show the optimal solutions under discretion and commitment given
the welfare-based relative weight on the output gap λ. The diamond is the solution under
Rogoff-discretion with weight λ˜.
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